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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Priority No. 2 
v. : 
JACOB ROSS HALE, : Case No. 990939-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated robbery, and aggravated 
kidnapping, both enhanced first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction of the appeal 
under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. When the only juror to overhear the inadvertent remark,"they are guilty," 
from a then-unidentified person at the courthouse entrance (a) dismissed it as a 
"joke", (b) did not relate it to defendant's or any other case, and (b) did not believe 
it would interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial, is the trial court's denial 
of a mistrial motion based thereon "plainly wrong"? 
The denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Indeed, 
"[u]nless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that 
the incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a 
fair trial, we will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." State v. 
DeCorso, 1999 UT 57,1f 38, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 
1230 (Utah 1997)), cert, denied, U.S. 120 S.Ct.l 181 (2000). 
2. When the victim's identifications of defendant from a photo array and 
from a subsequent lineup are superior in every respect to the showup identification 
upheld in State v. Ramirez, did the trial court properly determine that the victim's 
identifications in this case were constitutionally reliable and therefore admissible? 
A trial court's decision to admit eyewitness evidence is a question of law that is 
reviewed under a correctness standard. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 782 n.3 (Utah 
1991); State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1270 (Utah 1993); State v. Parra, 972 P.2d 
924, 925 (Utah App. 1998). However, "a correctness review necessarily incorporates a 
review of the trial court's resolution of factual questions and the associated determination 
of credibility that may underlie the decision to admit [,]" which subsidiary findings will 
be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Thurman, 846 P.2d at 1270. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or 
property, without due process of law." 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of aggravated robbery, a first degree 
felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-302 (1999), and one count of aggravated 
kidnapping, a first degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-302 (1999). 
The use of a handgun during the commission of the offenses gave rise to enhanced 
penalties under UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203 (1999) (R. 005-007). 
A Ramirez1 hearing to determine the reliability of the victim's identification of 
defendant from a photo-spread, and a subsequent line-up, was held on 19 August 1999 
(R. 246) (a copy of the hearing transcript is contained in addendum B). The trial court 
ruled "that the [the victim's identification of the defendant] is a reliable eye-witness 
identification" (R. 246:47), add. B. Thereafter, written findings and conclusions in 
support of the ruling were entered on 27 October 1999 (R. 224-228) (a copy of the written 
ruling is contained in addendum C). 
Prior to trial, but after the jury was empaneled, defendant moved for a mistrial 
based on an allegation of juror taint (R. 247:116) (the pertinent transcript pages are 
contained in addendum A). Specifically, defendant alleged that the jury pool overheard 
a "guilty"comment at the courthouse entrance (id.). The alleged taint was brought to the 
trial court's attention by an attorney who had overheard the remark (R.247:l 16-132), 
add. A. The trial court's inquiry revealed that the only juror to overhear the remark, "they 
]See State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991). 
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are guilty," did not know where it came from, dismissed it as a joke, did not relate it 
defendant's or any other case, and did not believe that it would not effect her ability to be 
fair and impartial (R. 247:120), add. A. Finding that the incident would not, therefore, 
impact defendant's case, the trial court denied the mistrial motion (R. 247:144), add. A. 
At the conclusion of the two-day jury trial (R. 247, 248), defendant was convicted 
as charged (R. 248:102-103). The trial court imposed the indeterminate statutory term of 
from ten-years-to-life for the aggravated kidnaping, and the statutory indeterminate term 
of from five-years-to-life for the aggravated robbery (R. 249:23). Additionally, the trial 
court imposed one additional year for each conviction based on the gun enhancements (R. 
249: 23). The sentences were to be served consecutively {id). Defendant filed a timely 
notice of appeal (R. 215). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Mitchell Lewis was enjoying his lunch and reading the newspaper while sitting in 
his car at Sugarhouse Park when defendant and a cohort pointed a gun at him through his 
car window, robbed him of his cash and credit cards, kidnapped him, and ultimately left 
him stranded up Big Cottonwood Canyon. 
Aggravated Robbery 
At approximately 11:45 a.m., on 19 March 1999, Lewis was sitting in his white 
Honda, reading the newspaper and eating his lunch (R. 247:146-147). He looked into his 
rear view mirror and noticed two Caucasian men, both wearing baggy pants and white 
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tank tops, approaching his car from the rear (R. 246:9) (R. 247:153). As Lewis returned 
to reading his paper, the men passed by the passenger side of his car (R. 246:10) (R. 
247:153). Lewis noticed the men again when he looked up to observe that they were 
about one hundred feet in front of his car and walking back towards him (R. 246:11) (R. 
247:154). Lewis noticed the men a third time when they walked to the driver's side of his 
car (R. 246:12, R. 247:154). 
Defendant leaned towards Lewis's window and asked, "Do you know where Tlay 
It Again Sports' is ?" (R. 246:12-13) (R. 247:156). Lewis said "No. I don't think it is in 
this area" (id.). Defendant then "lifted" a shirt he had draped over his hand to reveal a 
gun pointed directly at Lewis and said, "Well you're going to take us there anyway" (R. 
246:13) (R. 247:156). Defendant ordered Lewis to unlock the car door, and Lewis 
complied (R. 246:14) (R. 247:157). 
Codefendant Jason Dongarra, moved to the passenger side of Lewis's car, opened 
the door and "rummaged" through Lewis's belongings, including his wallet (R. 246:14) 
(R. 247:157). Dongarra took Lewis's cash while defendant took both Lewis's check 
guarantee card and his Visa card and compelled Lewis to disclose his personal 
identification number (R. 247:158, 161-162). 
Defendant then ordered Lewis to get into the back seat of the car (R. 247:158-160). 
Defendant sat next to Lewis in the back seat while Dongarra drove (R. 247:151, 
159-160). Defendant continued to rifle through Lewis's wallet, and after looking at 
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Lewis's drivers license, told Lewis that he knew where he lived and that he had people in 
the area (R. 247:161). 
Aggravated Kidnapping 
Dongarra drove the Honda out of Sugarhouse Park as defendant continued to point 
the gun at Lewis (R. 247:159). Defendant directed Dongarra to get onto Interstate 80 and 
head east (id.). Dongarra left the interstate at 3900 South and heading into the Olympus 
Cove area (R. 247: 60-161). Defendant told Dongarra not to stop in Olympus Cove 
because "there are too many houses, too many people. People will hear the shots here" 
(R. 247: 63). Defendant asked Lewis if he was familiar with the movie Pulp Fiction and 
then told Lewis, "[i]f you try to get out of the car, I'll shoot you" (R. 247:163). 
Dongarra eventually ended up four or five mile up Big Cottonwood Canyon (R. 
247:164). Defendant asked Lewis if he had a tire iron in the trunk (R. 247:166-167). He 
then ordered Dongarra to open the trunk and handing him the gun, said, "[k]eep this on 
him, and keep the safety off (R. 247:166-167). After searching the trunk, defendant 
returned to the side of the car, retrieved the gun from Dongarra, and ordered Lewis to 
walk down into the ravine at the side of the road (R. 247:168). Lewis did as he was 
ordered, with defendant following behind (id.). Defendant then ordered Lewis to sit on a 
rock while defendant stood nearby (R. 247: 170-171). Dongarra left and did not return 
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for approximately two hours (R. 247:173). Upon his return Dongarra yelled to defendant 
that he had obtained $3002 (id.). 
Defendant ordered Lewis to walk further down into the ravine (R. 247:174). He 
then instructed Lewis to sit on another rock, remove his shoes, and "throw them as far as 
you can" (id.). Defendant also told Lewis to stay put for at least twenty minutes (R. 
247:176). Defendant and Dongarra then left in Lewis's car, leaving him stranded (R. 
247:175-177).3 
Lewis was eventually rescued by a passing motorist and reported the kidnapping 
and robbery to police (R. 247:176). Ten days later, Lewis identified defendant from a 
photo array ( R. 247:179-182), and from a lineup approximately one month after that (R. 
247:181-182, 204-205). Lewis identified defendant a third time at trial (R. 247:155-156, 
182). 
Defendant asserted he was at his girlfriend's home near Sugarhouse Park at the 
time of the robbery and kidnaping, and that he was heavier and taller than the person 
Lewis described, and otherwise failed to match Lewis's description (R. 247:25-30). 
2It later was disclosed that this money was obtained using Lewis's check guarantee 
card (R. 247:223-225). 
3Defendant and Dongarra were seen with Lewis's Honda later that same day and 
for approximately four days following the incident (R. 247:223-226). Thereafter they 
ditched the Honda in Copperton, Utah (R. 247: 227). Dongarra wiped the car down to 
remove any fingerprints and also removed the tires and placed them on the ground near 
the Honda (R. 247:228). 
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Defendant admitted being with Dongarra in a stolen Honda on the afternoon of the 
robbery and kidnapping (R. 247:31-35). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. Defendant fails to demonstrate that the trial court's refusal to grant a 
mistrial was plainly wrong. Indeed, the only juror to overhear the inadvertant remark, 
"they are guilty," from a then-unidentified person at the courthouse entrance (a) 
dismissed it as a "joke", (b) did not relate it to defendant's or any other case, and (b) did 
not believe it would interfere with her ability to be fair and impartial. 
Point II. The victim's identifications of defendant from a photo array and from a 
subsequent lineup are superior in every respect to the showup identification upheld in 
State v. Ramirez', therefore, the trial court properly determined that the identifications 
were constitutionally reliable and admissible for the jury's evaluation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINTI 
DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTITLED TO A MISTRIAL WHERE 
PRIOR TO JURY SELECTION IN THIS CASE, A SUBSEQUENTLY 
EMPANELED JUROR OVERHEARD SOMEONE YELL, "THEY 
ARE GUILTY," AT THE COURTHOUSE ENTRANCE 
In Point I of his brief, defendant asserts that he was entitled to a mistrial because a 
member of the jury pool who was subsequently selected to serve on his jury overheard 
someone at the courthouse entrance yell, i;they are guilty"(R. 247:116-120). Aplt. Br. at 
13-21. The trial court denied the motion after determining that the incident would not 
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impact defendant's case because the juror stated that she (a) had dismissed the comment 
as a joke, (b) did not believe it was related to defendant's or any other case, and that (c) it 
would not effect her ability to be fair and impartial (R. 247:120, 144). Defendant fails to 
demonstrate that the trial court's ruling is "plainly wrong." State v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 
57, U 38, 993 P.2d 837 (quoting State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997)), 
cert, denied, U.S. 120 S.Ct.1181 (2000). 
A. Proceedings Below 
Prior to trial, but after the jury was empaneled, defendant moved for a mistrial 
alleging juror taint (R. 247:133), add. A. Specifically, defendant alleged that the jury 
pool overheard a comment, "guilty, guilty, guilty," made by a bailiff operating the metal 
detector at the courthouse entrance (R. 247:116), add. A. The incident was brought to the 
trial court's attention by an attorney who had overheard it (id.). The trial court questioned 
its own bailiffs, the empaneled jurors, and both of the involved courthouse entrance 
bailiffs (247:119-123,129-131), add. A. 
Neither Bailiff Rowley, nor Bailiff Hall, the bailiffs assigned to bring the jury pool 
to defendant's courtroom, overheard the remark (R. 247:119, 126), add. A. 
The empaneled jurors were questioned as a group whether they had overheard 
"any reference to defendant's case, guilt, non-guilt, innocence, whatever, from any of the 
officers at the metal detector this morning?" (R. 247:120), add. A. Juror Murray, the 
only juror to raise her hand, said that she had overheard "[something to the effect of-
9 
'they are guilty[,]'" but was "not sure who said it, someone yelled it out" (id.). The trial 
.4 court's colloquy with juror Murray proceeded as follows: 
THE COURT: Do you understand that this was just a joking 
comment. 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: 
(R. 247:119-120), add. A. 
Yes. 
You did not understand it to be pertaining to this or any other 
particular case; is that right? 
Yes. 
From your expression, Ms. Murray, I'm assuming that you 
felt it was kind of a silly remark and did not pertain to this 
case; is that correct? 
Yes. 
Has that in any way interfered with your ability to be fair and 
impartial in this case? 
No. 
And you did not understand it to refer to this case in 
particular; is that correct? 
That's correct. 
Following this exchange, the trial court instructed the empaneled jurors that they 
4Juror Murray was previously sworn in along with the other jurors, in connection 
with the just completed voir dire proceeding (R. 247:11). 
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. . . should understand that the bailiffs and the officers who were at 
the mental [sic] detectors had have [sic] no idea which cases are being tried 
in which court. 
And even if they did know which cases are being tried in which 
courts, they know noting about any of the cases. It would be to say there 
are about fourteen judges on this floor, and that some of the cases are 
criminal, some of them are civil. They all involve different facts. 
And there certainly is never any conversation by this Court or my 
staff with any of those people, nor do they share copies of the pleadings or 
anything of that nature. 
(R. 247:121), add. A. 
The trial court also ascertained that neither defense counsel nor the prosecutor had 
spoken about the case "with anyone at the portals" (id.). 
Defense counsel requested one follow-up question of juror Murray: "[W]hether or 
not there was any response by anybody to what Ms. Murray overheard by another bailiff 
or any other person" (R. 247:122), add. A. The trial court agreed to so inquire and 
Murray said, "No" (id.). The trial court then reiterated its understanding that Murray had 
not discussed the comment "with any of [her] fellow jurors," and that she had not taken it 
seriously, believing it to have been "silly" (id.). Juror Murray affirmed the trial court's 
understanding (id.). 
Turning again to the empaneled jurors, the trial court stated: 
All right. And Again, let me tell each and every one of you that you 
know the work that occurs in this building, whether it's a civil case or a 
criminal case, or domestic case, it's important work, and I think that 
sometimes some people don't give it the seriousness it deserves because 
they try to lighten the mood. The reference Ms. Murray heard was not in 
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connection with this case in particular, and it sounds like it was an 
absolutely stupid, insensitive remark, certainly should never have been 
made. 
But I think it's safe to say that it had nothing to do with this case, 
and that it should never have been made in any event. 
But I want to be sure that all of you understand that if you feel its 
impacts, you, Ms. Murray, or any of you in hearing about it, I want to know 
now. Do any of you feel like it's had any effect on you? 
(R. 247:122-123), add. A. The jurors all shook their heads in the negative (R. 247:123), 
add. A. Defense counsel requested no further inquiry (id). 
Shortly thereafter, outside the jury's presence, the trial court questioned the two 
involved bailiffs, Bailiff Twitcheli, and Bailiff Galloway (R. 247:124-125, 129), add. A. 
Bailiff Galloway said his conversation with Bailiff Twitcheli was in a "joking manner" 
(R. 247:129), add. A. Bailiff Twitcheli admitted saying to Bailiff Galloway: "'You 
know, it's a good thing when they put the jury together that they don't instruct them on 
guilty, guilty, guilty, guilty'" (R. 247:130), add. A. Both bailiffs denied that their 
conversation had any reference to defendant's case (id.). Bailiff Twitcheli observed that 
he "had no idea who the jury was for or what it was pertaining- who the jury was [sic]" 
(id). Bailiff Galloway affirmed Bailiff Twitchell's recollection, adding only that he 
laughingly responded, "'guilty, guilty, ' . . . that's it" (R. 247:131), add. A. He was not 
looking at the jurors at the time he made the comment, and he did not understand that any 
one of the jurors had overheard him (id.). The trial court admonished the bailiffs, and 
then, turning to defense counsel, observed that it was "clear" that 
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this was in the context of general comment about how important it was that 
jurors not be told anything about not guilty or guilty, guilty, guilty, but 
apparently those words were used. Apparently the one juror who heard it 
heard the word guilty. I don't- the juror was clear that she did not form an 
opinion as a result of that, nor did she correlate those remarks or those 
words-I should say, with this case, or take them to heart. 
(R. 247:132), add-A. 
Thereafter, although recognizing that "[juror Murray] indicated that she didn't take 
it seriously," defense counsel moved for a mistrial (R. 247:133-134), add. A. The trial 
court denied the motion on the ground the incident would not in any way "interfere" with 
defendant's right to a fair trial: "And I thought about it and considered it, and if I thought 
it would have any impact, I would have granted the motion. But I don't think it will" (R. 
247:144), add. A. 
A. Defendant Fails to Establish that Any Unauthorized Juror 
Contact Occurred 
In claiming prejudice on appeal, defendant relies on the declaration in State v. 
Pike, 712 P.2d 277, 279 (Utah 1985), that "a rebuttable presumption of prejudice arises 
from any unauthorized contact during a trial between witnesses, attorneys or court 
personnel and jurors which goes beyond a mere incidental, unintended, and brief 
contact." See Aplt. Br. at 13. The supreme court identifies two reasons for its rebuttable 
presumption rule: "(1) the inherent difficulty in proving how or whether a juror has in fact 
been influenced by conversing with a participant in the trial, and (2) the deleterious effect 
upon the judicial process because of the appearance of impropriety from such contact." 
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State v. Jonas, 793 P.2d 902, 908 (Utah App.) (citing Pike, 712 P.2d at 280), cert, 
denied, 804 P.2d 1232 (Utah 1990). Significantly, Pike involved a conversation about a 
personal incident which took place between an important prosecution witness (arresting 
officer and eyewitness) and three jurors. The conversation in Pike accordingly gave rise 
to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice because it was "more than a brief, incidental 
contact and no doubt had the effect of breeding a sense of familiarity that could clearly 
affect the juror's judgment as to the [witness's] credibility." Pike, 712 P.2d at 281. 
Neither reason given for presuming prejudice is present here. Indeed, this case 
does not involve a contact, let alone, a conversation, between a juror and a trial 
participant. See State v. Tenney, 913 P.2d 750, 756-757 (Utah App.) (distinguishing Pike 
on ground that disputed conversation was between a juror and a trial outsider), cert, 
denied, 923 P.2d 693 (Utah 1996). As there was no "contact" here, there was "no 
appearance of impropriety from such contact." Jonas, 793 P.2d at 908. To the contrary, 
Tenney teaches that under circumstance such as here, "there is a presumption that the 
juror[] behaved properly, and it is the defendant's burden to provide 'some definite proof 
of misconduct and that the said misconduct was prejudicial.'" Tenney, 913 P.2d at 756 
(quoting Arellano v. Western Pac. R.R., 5 Utah 2d 146, 298 P.2d 527, 530 (Utah 1956)). 
Tenney applied this presumption of proper juror behavior even though the juror in that 
case initiated a conversation about Tenney with a work colleague, a trial outsider. Id. at 
756. 
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Here, the trial court's inquiry demonstrated that juror Murray did not even know 
who made the inadvertent "guilty" remark, and that neither of the involved bailiffs had 
directed their comments to juror Murray or any other member of the jury pool (R. 
247:130-131), add. A. Indeed, the bailiffs were not even looking in the direction of the 
jury pool at the time the remark was made (id.). The most that can be said is that juror 
Murray overheard the "guilty" remark by a then unknown person at the courthouse 
entrance, before juror Murray was even selected as a juror in defendant's case (R. 247: 
120), add. A. Importantly, juror Murray did not relate the remark to defendant's or any 
other case in particular, nor did she believe it would effect her ability to be fair and 
impartial (id.). She also did not discuss the remark with any of the other members of the 
jury pool, and no other juror reported hearing the remark, or anything similar thereto (id). 
Accordingly, no unauthorized "contact" occurred and the trial court reasonably 
determined that a mistrial was unwarranted.5 
5Defendant complains that the other jurors learned of the comment when the trial 
court's questioned juror Murray. Aplt. Br. at 19. However, as set out above, they heard 
about the incident contemporaneous with the trial court's admonition that the improper 
comment was inadvertent, unrelated to defendant's case, and should play no part in their 
deliberations (see R. 247:122-123), add. A. All the jurors shook their heads in the 
negative when the trial court asked if they felt the remark had "had any effect''on them 
(R. 247:123), add. A. Defense counsel requested no further inquiry, either individually, 
or as a group (id). Defendant points to nothing in the record suggesting that the jurors' 
assurances, that the remark had no effect on them, should be discounted. Indeed, contrary 
to defendant's assertion, the jurors, like juror Murray, were under oath at the time. See 
n.4, supra, and subsection (B), infra. 
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Even if juror Murray's inadvertent overhearing of the remark here rises to the level 
of an "unauthorized contact/' under Pike, it still does not give rise to a presumption of 
prejudice. In Jonas, 793 P.2d at 908, this Court found that an even an "intentional" 
contact did not necessarily give rise to presumptive prejudice because it was also an 
"incidental" contact. Just prior to deliberations in Jonas, a juror was excused after his 
pregnant sister was murdered. Id. at 906-907. Upon leaving the courthouse, the juror 
asked the bailiff to explain his absence to the other jurors and the bailiff did so: "I went 
in and I told them that Mr. Davis wouldn't be in because his sister was the lady that was 
shot out in West Valley." M a t 907. 
On appeal, this Court distinguished Pike on the grounds the intentional contact in 
Jonas (a) did not involve either a trial participant, or (b) a conversation "in the normal 
sense of an 'oral exchange of sentiments, observations, opinion, [or] ideas." Id. at 908. 
Indeed, "[tjhere was no exchange at all because the jurors said nothing." Id. 
Accordingly, the Court concluded that the first Pike concern, the difficulty in proving a 
juror has in fact been influenced was absent. Jonas, 793 P.2d at 908. The Jonas bailiffs 
message was only tenuously connected to the trial, and though intentional, it was not the 
kind of communication which would prejudice the jury judgement regarding their verdict. 
Id. at 908. Particularly when the bailiffs credibility was not at issue. Id. He did not 
testify and the truth of his statement was irrelevant to the trial proceeding. Id. 
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The second Pike concern about the appearance of impropriety was also deemed 
absent. Id. While juror/witness contacts "make the entire judicial process look collusive 
or unfair" the Court could not say the same of the bailiff/jury contact in Jonas because it 
was not connected to a trial issue and was unavoidable as the bailiff was assigned to 
minister to the jurors' needs. Id. Thus the Court concluded: "We do not believe that 
Pike compels the conclusion that prejudice presumptively results when a bailiff says 
anything other than "Hello" or "Good morning" to a juror at a time when the case has not 
even been submitted to the jury for deliberations." Jonas, 793 P.2d at 908-909. The 
Court also emphasized that the Jonas bailiff did not mingle with the jurors or converse 
with them; nor did he interrupt their deliberations. Id. at 909. Therefore, his brief contact 
concerning something tangential to the trial itself did not give rise to any appearance of 
impropriety and raised no presumption of prejudice. Id. 
The instant facts present an even more compelling case against presumptive 
prejudice than either Tenney or Jonas. Unlike these cases, no contact and/or 
conversation, intentional or otherwise occurred here. See also State v. Day, 815 P.2d 
1345, 1350 (Utah App. 1991) (initial unauthorized contact between State's witness (a 
deputy sheriff), and juror, though intentional, was also incidental, brief and without 
conversation; therefore, no presumptive prejudice). 
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B. Any Arguable Presumptive Prejudice Was Adequately Rebutted 
Even if the inadvertent overhearing of the remark at the courthouse entrance is 
deemed sufficient to give rise to a rebuttable presumption of prejudice under Pike, it is 
adequately rebutted here for the same reasons that it is doubtful the presumption even 
attached in the first instance. See Point 11(B) (C), above. Despite defendant's suggestion 
to the contrary, nothing in the record indicates that juror Murray was untruthful when she 
indicated that she (a) dismissed the comment as a "joke"; (b) did not relate it to this or 
any other trial, and that (c) it would not effect her ability to be fair and impartial (R. 
247:120), add. A. 
Defendant cites Logan City v. Carlsen, 799 P.2d 224, 227 (Utah App. 1990), to 
support his assertion that juror Murray's statements are inadequate to rebut any 
presumption of prejudice here because they were not made under oath. Aplt. Br. at 19. 
However, Carlsen is distinguishable here, first, because it involved an intentional, and 
lengthy unauthorized conversation between the bailiff and jurors regarding the "sensitive 
subject of sentencing." Id. at 225. Second, the Carlsen trial court did not inquire of the 
jurors whether they were prejudiced by the improper contact. Id. at 226. Under these 
circumstances, the Court found the Carlsen bailiffs unsworn statement insufficient to 
rebut the presumption of prejudice. Id. 
In this case, contrary to Carlsen, the trial court inquired of the jurors, all of whom 
had been sworn in prior to their participation the voir dire proceeding {see R. 247:11), 
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whether they had overheard anything related to defendant's trial (R. 247:119), add. A. 
As set forth above, only juror Murray responded affirmatively, and she indicated that she 
had not only dismissed the remark as a "joke," but that she had not communicated it to 
others, nor did she believe it would effect her ability to be fair and impartial (R. 247:120), 
add. A. Thus, the instant trial court complied with Carlsen's teaching that "in most 
instances it would be helpful" to have the effected jurors testify. Id. at 226. 
Based on the above, the trial court's denial of the mistrial motion is not "plainly 
wrong" and should be affirmed. DeCorso, 1999 UT at \ 38. 
POINT II 
BECAUSE LEWIS'S IDENTIFICATIONS OF DEFENDANT FROM 
A PHOTO ARRAY AND LINEUP ARE SUPERIOR IN EVERY 
RESPECT TO THE SHOWUP IDENTIFICATION UPHELD IN 
RAMIREZ, THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DETERMINED THE 
IDENTIFICATIONS WERE CONSTITUTIONALLY RELIABLE 
AND ADMISSIBLE 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that Lewis's identifications of him are 
unreliable because: (a) Lewis was extremely frightened during the kidnaping and robbery; 
and (b) Lewis did not have sufficient opportunity prior to the crimes to view defendant. 
Aplt. Br. at 30-31, 33. Additionally, defendant claims that Lewis's identification of him 
at the lineup was tainted because police told Lewis that he picked the same individual 
they suspected following his identification of defendant from the earlier photo array. 
Aplt. Br. at 32-33. Defendant's claims are meritless. 
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A. The Ruling Below 
Following an evidentiary hearing to determine the reliability of Lewis's pretrial 
identifications of defendant, the trial court made the following factual findings:6 
1. On March 19, 1999, Mitch Lewis, a white male in his later thirties, 
was seated alone in his car parked in Sugarhouse Park reading the 
newspaper. It was daytime and the area was well lighted. Mr. Lewis 
could see clearly with his glasses that he was wearing at the time 
(see R. 246:6-9, 42). 
2. Mr. Lewis looked into the rearview mirror and saw two white males 
walking toward him. He returned to reading (see R. 246:9-10). 
3. Mr. Lewis looked up again as the two walked within a few feet of his 
car (see R. 246:10). 
4. Mr. Lewis looked up again and saw the two males walking 
back toward his car. This time Mr. Lewis saw the faces of the 
two (see R. 246:11). 
5. Mr. Lewis looked up the final time to see the two males standing 
within a few feet of the driver's door of his car (see R. 246: 246:12). 
6. One of the males, later identified as defendant, spoke to Mr. Lewis 
about the location of a local business (see R. 246:12-13). 
7. Defendant had dark glasses on and had some facial hair but 
otherwise his face was uncovered. The other male, later identified as 
Justin Dongarra did not have his face covered either (see R. 246:12, 
32). 
&• As Mr. Lewis first spoke with the two males, he was not upset or 
frightened. He was rested and was not under the influence of alcohol 
or drugs. He had taken some prescription drugs. One of these was 
6The trial court's factual findings accurately recite the pertinent facts; therefore, 
they are reproduced here, adding citation to the transcript of the evidentiary hearing. 
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for depression and actually helped clear his mind. He was not under 
the influence of these drugs nor did they interfere with his ability to 
observe and remember (see R. 246:6-7, 13, 44). 
9. Defendant pulled a gun and pointed it at Mr. Lewis. Defendant then 
had Mr. Lewis get out of the car. As Mr. Lewis did, he stood within 
a few feet of defendant. He was able to see defendant as they stood 
and was able to compare heights and listen to his voice (see R. 
246:13-15,42-43). 
10. Defendant directed Mr. Lewis to sit in the back seat of the car. 
Defendant got into the back seat and sat inches away from Mr. Lewis 
(see R. 246:15-16). 
11. Justin Dongarra drove the car. For more than one hour, the 
three drove around. During this time the two made direct and 
implied threats to Mr. Lewis (see R. 246:15-16). 
12. Mr. Lewis saw the side of defendant's face and could see 
defendant's eyes through the side of the dark glasses. Mr. Lewis 
noted that defendant blinked in a slow unusual manner. Mr. Lewis 
also saw the front of defendant's face for brief periods of time during 
the trip (see R. 247:17,26). 
13. Eventually, defendant and Mr. Dongarra drove Mr. Lewis up Big 
Cottonwood Canyon and stopped the car. They made Mr. Lewis get 
out and walk down the roadside toward the creek. Defendant 
followed. Mr. Dongarra drove away in the car (see R. 246:18). 
14. Defendant held Mr. Lewis at gunpoint for another hour. During this 
time, defendant was only a few feet away from Mr. Lewis. The two 
talked. Mr. Lewis saw defendant's face from the front. It was still 
daylight and lighting allowed Mr. Lewis to see defendant's face 
clearly (see R. 246:19, 30). 
15. Mr. Lewis was frightened during the event but he was deliberate and 
thoughtful in his approach. Furthermore, Mr. Lewis tried to observe and 
remember the defendant's face. He also tried to engage defendant in a 
conversation, and did so for a considerable time, in an attempt to keep 
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defendant calm so Mr. Lewis would survive the encounter {see R. 246:17, 
19,26). 
16. Eventually, Mr. Lewis was released and he contacted the police and 
reported the crime {see R. 246:19-20). 
17. Approximately ten days later, police showed Mr. Lewis two series of 
six color photographs. One set that included defendant's photo and 
one set that included Mr. Dongarra's photo. The photographs 
contained different individuals with similar characteristics. Mr. 
Lewis was not told whether the defendant or Mr. Dongarra were in 
the photographic lineups. Mr. Lewis picked out both defendant and 
Mr. Dongarra. After Mr. Lewis picked out both suspects, the 
detective told Mr. Lewis that he had picked out the two persons 
arrested for the crime {see R. 246:19-22, 33, 43-44). 
18. On May 4, 1999 a lineup was held in the Salt Lake County S.O. 
lineup room. Eight individuals with similar characteristics were in 
the lineup. Defendant was included in those eight. Again Mr. Lewis 
picked out defendant as the person who committed the crime 
charged. Afterwards Mr. Lewis asked the prosecutor if he had 
picked the defendant. The prosecutor confirmed that Mr. Lewis had 
picked out the person charged with the crime {see R. 246:24-25, 33-
34). 
19. Mr. Lewis has never identified persons other than defendant and Mr. 
Dongarra as the two persons who committed the crime {see R. 
246:22-23, 33-34). 
20. Mr. Lewis' testimony about the events was detailed and clear. 
He is an unusually articulate and clear witness. He did not 
know the suspects or have any motive against them {see R. 
246:41,42). 
(R. 224-226), add. C. 
Based on the above findings, the trial court concluded as follows: 
1. Mr. Lewis had an adequate opportunity to view the persons who 
robbed and kidnapped him. The event took over two hours, a 
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considerable amount of time to observe. The light was sufficient. 
The suspects stood or sat at close distances to Mr. Lewis. Other than 
the dark glasses the suspects' faces were not covered or obscured. 
2. Mr. Lewis paid a high degree of attention to the event. He knew he 
was being robbed. He deliberately tried to see and remember the 
suspects who were committing the crimes of which he was the 
victim. 
3. Mr. Lewis was not limited or impaired. Instead, he was very 
deliberate, calm and thoughtful. He is also clear and articulate. He 
was old enough to understand and comprehend the nature of the 
events. He had sufficient capacity to observe and remember the 
event. 
4. Mr. Lewis' identification was spontaneous and not the product of 
suggestion. The photographic and physical lineups were conducted 
properly and not in a suggestive manner. 
5. The nature of the event was one that Mr. Lewis was likely to 
remember and relate correctly. The race of the participants was the 
same. Mr. Lewis was free from bias. Mr. Lewis tried to remember 
the event. It lasted a long time. Mr. Lewis understood that he was 
being robbed and kidnapped. 
6. The detective's statement confirming that Mr. Lewis had picked out 
the suspects held by the police did not occur until after the 
photographic lineup was completed. The prosecutor's statements 
that Mr. Lewis had picked out the person charged did not occur until 
after the lineup was completed. These statements did not make 
either the photographic lineup or the physical lineup improperly 
suggestive. 
7. Mr. Lewis' out-of-court and in-court identifications are sufficiently 
reliable that the identifications should be presented to the jury during 
the trial. 
(R. 226-227), add. C. 
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B. Ramirez Compels Affirmance on These Facts 
In comparing this case with Ramirez, defendant has variously omitted facts 
describing conditions and circumstances of observation superior to those in Ramirez, and 
gratuitously presumed that this victim had a compromised mental state throughout the 
aggravated robbery and kidnapping incident. See Aplt. Br. at 28-34. Contrary to 
defendant's suggestion, Lewis's identifications of defendant from a photo array and from 
a subsequent lineup are superior in every respect to the sole eyewitness identification 
upheld in Ramirez. 
In Ramirez, the Utah Supreme Court extended its recognition that eyewitness 
testimony is both potent yet fallible, see State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 488-91 (Utah 
1986), thereby requiring the trial court, in cases where eyewitness identification was 
central to the case, to undertake "an in-depth appraisal of the identifications' reliability," 
preliminary to admitting such testimony under article I, section 7 of the Utah 
Constitution. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 780. Noting that "[t]he ultimate question to be 
determined is whether, under the totality of the circumstances, the identification was 
reliable," the supreme court listed the following pertinent facts by which constitutional 
reliability must be determined: 
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2) the 
witness's degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) the 
witness's capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical and 
mental acuity; (4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the 
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the even being observed and the 
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likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate it correctly. 
This last area includes such factors as whether the even was an ordinary one 
in the mind of the observer during the time it was observed and whether the 
race of the actor was the same as the observer's. 
Id. at 781.7 Applying these factors to the eyewitness identification in Ramirez, the 
supreme court found that, although an "extremely close case," the trial court had properly 
denied Ramirez's motion to suppress. 817 P.2d at 782-84.8 
7In Ramirez, two armed, masked men robbed a Pizza Hut. Id. at 778. Shortly 
before 1:00 a.m., Kathy Davis, the manager of the Pizza Hut, was preparing to leave the 
restaurant with her husband, John Davis, and her brother, Gerald Watson. Id. Upon 
leaving, they were accosted by a man (the "pipe man") wearing a scarf across his face 
who demanded the day's receipts. Id. A scuffle followed and the pipe man hit Wilson 
with the pipe and told a previously undetected robber (the "gunman") to kill Wilson if he 
moved again. Id. The gunman, Ramirez, also wore a scarf covering most of his face, and 
was crouched near the corner of the building, holding a gun. Id. When the Davises 
returned with the bank bag, the robbers fled. Id. 
Ramirez was stopped a short time after the robbery and a few blocks from the 
Pizza Hut, when he was found to match the description of one of the robbery suspects. 
Id. at 777-776. Police brought the Davises and Wilson to the scene of Ramirez's 
detention, apparently informing them that "the officers had found someone who matched 
the description of one of the robbers." Id. at 777. When the witnesses arrived at the 
showup, Ramirez, a dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link 
fence. Id. He was the only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were 
turned on him. Id. The witnesses viewed him from a patrol car. Id. Only Wilson was 
able to identify Ramirez as the gunman; the other two witnesses were unable to identify 
him as one of the robbers. Id. 
8Regarding the first factor, the witness's opportunity to view the actor during the 
event, the supreme court noted Wilson varied in his statements about how long he viewed 
the gunman, from a "few seconds" or a "second," to "a minute" or longer. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 782. The evidence indicated that the gunman was crouched by the end of the 
building, that Wilson viewed him from between ten to thirty feet, that at one point his 
view was obstructed, that the lighting was variously described from good to poor and the 
gunman was in a shadowy area, and that Wilson could only determine that the gunman's 
eyes were small. Id. at 782-83. 
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As to the second factor, the witness's attention to the actor, Wilson was fully 
aware that a robbery was taking place and claimed to have focused on the gunman to the 
exclusion of the pipe man, even though he was still threatened by the pipe man when he 
saw the gunman and gave a much more detailed description of the pipe man than of the 
gunman at the time of the robbery. Id. at 783. 
Regarding the third factor, the witness's capacity to observe the actor during the 
event, the supreme court found that it was reasonable to assume that Wilson experienced 
"a heightened degree of stress," since, in struggling with his assailant, the witness was hit 
once in the stomach with the pipe and almost hit a second time. Wilson described his 
eyesight as good with his glasses, and "[a]side from the late hour and the injury from the 
pipe blow," there was no record evidence of any other physical impairments. Id. 
The fourth reliability factor concerns whether the identification was spontaneous 
and remained consistent or whether it was the product of suggestion. Id. In Ramirez, the 
supreme court found that thirty minutes to an hour between the robbery and the 
identification as no indication that Wilson's mental capacity affected his identification. 
Id. at 783. Although he was aware that one of the other witnesses had not identified 
Ramirez, he was not otherwise exposed to other identifications or opinions, and neither of 
the other two witnesses identified Ramirez as the gunman. Id. However, the witness's 
physical descriptions of the gunman were "confused." Id. Wilson have a very detailed 
description of the pipe man, but merely described the gunman as "a male Mexican, five 
feet nine inches to six feet tall, wearing a blue sweater and Levi's, with a white scarf 
around the lower part of his face." Id. John Davis, on the other hand, described Ramirez 
as five foot six inches tall and wearing a red and white cap. Id. at 784. Although 
Ramirez had readily visible tattoos on his arms, Wilson did not mention them at the time 
of the robbery or at the preliminary hearing, stating for the first time at trial that he had 
seen them on the gunman. Id. At the time of arrest, Ramirez was wearing Levi's and a 
blue sweatshirt with paint spattered on the front, but which may have been worn inside 
out and a brown baseball cap. Id. At the suppression hearing, Wilson positively stated 
that the gunman wore no hat, although at trial he was not sure. Id. 
Most "troublesome" for the supreme court was the "blatant suggestiveness" of the 
showup, which, involved the lone suspect, handcuffed to a fence, the target of headlights, 
surrounded by police who had indicated to witnesses that they had located someone who 
fit one of the robber's description. Id. The suggestiveness of the showup was 
compounded because none of the witnesses ever saw the gunman without the mask, and 
the sole identifying witness made his identification based only on the gunman's eyes, and 
view of which this Court assumed must have been compromised by the gunman's 
wearing a hat. Id. The supreme court somewhat discounted the racial distinction because 
the identification was based only on the gunman's eyes, physical size and clothing. Id. 
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(1) Lewis Had Over Two Hours to View Defendant During 
the Robbery and Kidnapping and Suffered From No 
Physical Impairment 
The first three Ramirez factors take into account an eyewitness's opportunity to 
view suspects, as well as the witnesses degree of attention to, and capacity to observe the 
suspects. Id. at 782. The Ramirez robber was masked, crouched down, and viewed from 
ten to thirty feet away, at night. Id. Here, on the other hand, Lewis had over two hours 
within which to view defendant's unmasked face (a) at the park, (b) while riding in the 
backseat of the car, and (c) in the ravine up Big Cottonwood Canyon (see R. 226), add. C 
See State v. Willett, 909 P.2d 218, 220, 224 (Utah 1995) (finding eyewitness's "few 
seconds" observation of defendant "sufficiently reliable" to be admitted). While 
defendant wore sunglasses most of the time, Lewis was able to see his face behind the 
glasses, particularly when he sat next to defendant in the back seat, separated only by a 
few inches {see R. 225), add. C. Lewis particularly concentrated on observing and 
remembering defendant's face and also intentionally engaged defendant in conversation 
(R. 225A), add. C. In particular, Lewis noted defendant's unusually slow blinking 
pattern (R. 225-224), add. C. These observations were all made in broad daylight while 
Lewis was wearing his own prescriptive glasses and he was not otherwise impaired (R. 
224-225A), add. C. 
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(2) Lewis Provided an Accurate Description to Police the Day 
of the Robbery and Kidnapping 
The fourth Ramirez factor takes into account the spontaniety and consistency of 
the eyewitness identification. 817 P.2d at 783. Lewis provided an accurate description to 
police the day of the robbery and kidnapping (R. 246:26), add. A. Based on Lewis's 
description, the police put together a photo array from which Lewis identified defendant 
10 days after the incident (R. 246:20-23), add. A. Thereafter, Lewis consistently 
identified defendant from a lineup held approximately one month after the photo array, 
and ultimately, at trial (R. 246:20-23), add. A, (R. 247:155-156). Any arguable 
discrepancies between Lewis's description of defendant and his appearance at the time of 
his arrest, do not render Lewis's identifications inadmissible, but bear on his credibility 
and weight the jurors may give the identification testimony. State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 
648, 658 (Utah App. 1992), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1992); State v. Perry, 899 
P.2d 1232, 1234-35 (Utah App. 1995) (upholding eyewitness identification describing 
Perry as clean shaven, 5'6" to 57" tall and weighing approximately 150 pounds, when at 
the time of his arrest Perry was 5'9" tall, 170 pounds and had a slight mustache). The jury 
was instructed accordingly {see Jury Instructions # 6 & 26) (the jury instructions are not 
enumerated in the record, but are contained in a manilla envelope marked "Exhibits"). 
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(3) Lewis's Second Identification of Defendant From a 
Lineup Procedure Was Not Unduly Suggestive 
The final and most critical Ramirez factor concerns the suggestibility of the 
showup identification in that case. In Ramirez, police informed the eyewitness prior to 
the showup that they had located an individual that fit one of the robbers' description. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 784. When the Ramirez witnesses arrived at the showup, Ramirez, a 
dark-complexioned Apache Indian, was handcuffed to a chain link fence. Id. He was the 
only suspect, and the spotlights and headlights of patrol cars were turned on him. Id. 
Ultimately, although troubled by the "blatant suggestiveness" of the Ramirez showup, the 
supreme court determined that eyewitness's identification in Ramirez was 
constitutionally reliable. Id. at 784. 
The instant case does not involve a showup identification; however, defendant 
complains that Lewis's second identification of him at the lineup was tainted by the fact 
that police told Lewis after the earlier photo array identification that he had identified the 
same individual they suspected as the robber/kidnapper. Aplt. Br. at 32. Defendant's 
claim lacks merit. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding the lineup here do not begin to 
approach the problematic showup which was upheld in Ramirez. 817 P.2d at 784. The 
only arguably suggestiveness defendant identifies is the fact that after the photo array, but 
before the lineup, Lewis was told he had correctly identified the suspect from the photo 
array. Aplt. Br. at 32. Based on Ramirez, that tangential statement is by itself is 
insufficient to demonstrate that the lineup identification was constitutionally tainted. 
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Moreover, any arguable suggestiveness was negated here when prior to the lineup 
identification, Lewis was told there was a "possibility" that neither suspect would be in 
the lineup (R. 246:24). 
The trial court's determination that Lewis's identifications of defendant, from a 
photo array and from a subsequent lineup, were constitutionally reliable is eminently 
reasonable and should therefore be upheld. The identification evidence was properly 
admitted for the jury's evaluation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's convictions by a jury for aggravated robbery and aggravated 
kidnapping should be affirmed. 
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AUGUST 2 3 , 1 9 9 9 SALT LAKE C I T Y , UTAH 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
* * * 
(COURT RESUMES SESSION NOW AT 1:20 P.M. 
WITH COUNSEL IN CHAMBERS.) 
MS. REMAL: I AM INFORMED THERE'S A 
POTENTIAL PROBLEM. 
THE COURT: OH, NO. 
MS. REMAL: WHEN I WENT BACK TO THE OFFICE 
AT LUNCHTIME, MY COLLEAGUE KIM, CLARK, WHO IS WITH 
US NOW, TOLD ME THAT THIS MORNING WHILE SHE WAS IN 
THE AREA OF THE ELEVATORS DOWNSTAIRS SHE OVERHEARD 
SOMETHING SHE THOUGHT I SHOULD KNOW. 
THE COURT: WHAT IS IT? 
MS. REMAL: APPARENTLY WHILE THE PANEL WAS 
STANDING THERE WAITING FOR THE ELEVATOR, THERE WAS 
BRIEF CONVERSATION WHERE THEY WERE HELD, AND THEY 
WERE HELD TO GO TO JUDGE LEWIS'S COURTROOM. FROM 
SOMEWHERE,BEHIND MS. CLARK, WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN 
THE AREA OF THE METAL DETECTORS, SHE HEARD A VOICE 
SAYING, "GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY." 
THE COURT: WHO SAID THAT? 
MS. CLARK: I CAN'T TELL YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE GUYS THAT DO THE INSPECTION WHEN YOU COME IN 
1 WERE BEHIND ME. THERE WAS THREE OF THEM THERE THIS 
2 MORNING. I JUST DIDN'T TURN AND LOOK. I DIDN'T 
3 WANT TO MAKE A BIG DEAL ABOUT IT AND MAKE IT WORSE 
4 THAN IT COULD HAVE BEEN. 
5 THE COURT: I WOULD LIKE TO KILL THEM. 
6 MS. CLARK: I WOULD THINK THEY WOULD KNOW 
7 BETTER. 
8 THE COURT: BUT WE DON'T KNOW WHO THEY 
9 WERE? 
10 MS. CLARK: I CAN REMEMBER TWO OF THE 
11 THREE. 
12 THE COURT: OKAY. WELL, ALL I CAN DO IS 
13 ASK IN A VERY CAREFUL WAY WHETHER THEY HEARD 
14 ANYTHING FROM THE BAILIFFS AT THE DOOR, JOKING ABOUT 
15 GUILT OR INNOCENCE, OR ANYTHING OF THAT NATURE. 
16 MY GUESS IS THEY DIDN'T HEAR ANYTHING, OR 
17 MY HOPE IS, LET ME TELL YOU, THAT WON'T HAPPEN 
18 AGAIN. I'M APPALLED. 
19 MS. CLARK: I WAS SPEAKING TO OFFICER 
20 ROWLEY, THINKING I'M GOING TO TAKE THE STAIRS 
21 BECAUSE IT WAS A BIG PANEL. 
22 THE COURT: THIS IS GOING TO A A REAL 
23 BROUHAHA. THIS APPALLS ME. IF YOU HAVE LOW I.Q. 
24 PEOPLE, IT'S ONE OF THE THINGS THAT CAN OCCUR. BUT 
2 5 YOU CERTAINLY DO NOT EXPECT THIS. 
WERE THERE ANY WOMEN BAILIFF'S THERE? IT 
WAS ALL MEN? 
WOMEN, 
MS. 
THE 
CLARK: 
COURT: 
THREE GUYS. THERE WEREN'T ANY 
IF THIS PANEL INDICATES IN ANY 
WAY THEY HEARD, WE'LL DEAL WITH IT. BUT THEY WILL 
BE PAYING THE COST OF THE JURY PERSONALLY. THAT 
INCENSES ME. 
HEARD 
MS. 
IT. 
THE 
YOU SAID. I 
OF IT. 
THANK 
DON'T THEY HAVE ANY JUDGMENT? 
CLARK: 
COURT: 
I DON'T KNOW IF OFFICER ROWLEY 
WE HAVE MADE A RECORD OF WHAT 
WILL ASK HIM. BUT THIS WILL TAKE CARE 
WE'LL GET ON 
YOU, KIM FOR -• 
MS. 
THE 
COUNSEL DO. 
CLARK: 
COURT: 
I THINK 
ON THE RECORD. I AM 
GIVEN 
WANTS 
BUT I ' 
THE CALIBER OF 
LET' S GO IN 
IT THE RECORD RIGHT AWAY. 
DO YOU WANT ME TO STAY? 
I DON'T THINK SO, UNLESS 
YOU'VE MADE CLEAR" WHAT HAPPENED 
JUST SORRY IT HAPPENED. BUT 
PEOPLE WE HIRE AT THE DOORS--
AND SEE WHAT WE CAN DO. NO ONE 
A MISTRIAL, I AM ASSUMING, IF WE CAN AVOID IT. 
MS . REMAL: 
M CONCERNED IF 
THE COURT: 
NO, NOT IF WE CAN AVOID IT. 
ANYONE OVERHEARD IT. 
WE'LL GO SEE. 
(PROCEEDINGS PROCEED IN OPEN COURT. 
1 COUNSEL PRESENT, DEFENDANT PRESENT.) 
2 THE'COURT: YOU ARE WELCOME TO BE SEATED 
3 AGAIN. THANK YOU. FOR THE RECORD, I HAVE PUT THE 
4 QUESTION JUST NOW TO OFFICER ROWLEY, WHO HEARD 
5 NOTHING, BUT INDICATED HE WAS AT THE BACK OF THE 
6 JURY, SORT OF SHEPHERDING THEM FORWARD. SO THAT'S 
7 AN INDICATION THIS WAS NOT HEARD BY EVERYONE. 
8 NOTHING MORE THAN THAT. 
9 (JURY BROUGHT INTO COURTROOM AND 
10 PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE.) 
11 THE COURT: TAKE YOUR ORIGINAL SEATS, IF 
12 YOU WOULD, UNLESS YOU'VE ALL DECIDED TO SWITCH 
13 PLACES. 
14 ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, LADIES AND 
15 GENTLEMEN. GOOD TO SEE YOU BACK. I HOPE YOU HAD A 
16 GOOD LUNCH. LET ME JUST ASK YOU: DID ANY OF YOU 
17 DISCUSS THE CASE OR FORM ANY OPINIONS OVER THE NOON 
18 HOUR, OR ALLOW ANYONE ELSE TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU? 
19 IF ANYONE DID, PLEASE RAISE YOUR HANDS. NO 
20 RAN ARE RAISED. ONE ADDITIONAL QUESTION: IT'S COME 
21 TO MY ATTENTION THAT ONE OR TWO OF THE BAILIFFS THAT 
22 DO THE MONITORING AT THE DOORS ON THE MAIN FLOOR BY 
2 3 THE METAL DETECTORS MAY HAVE MADE SOME JOKING 
24 REFERENCE TO CASES IN GENERAL AS YOU ALL WERE 
2 5 WALKING BY TO GET TO THE ELEVATORS. 
DID ANYONE HEAR ANY REFERENCE TO THIS CASE, 
GUILT, NON-GUILT, INNOCENCE, WHATEVER, FROM ANY OF 
THE OFFICERS AT THE METAL DETECTOR THIS MORNING? 
DID ANYONE HEARING ANYTHING? IF SO, RAISE 
YOUR HANDS. OUR THIRD PROSPECTIVE JUROR HAS RAISED 
HER HAND. AND THAT'S MS. MURRAY. MS. MURRAY, WHAT 
DO YOU RECALL HEARING. 
JUROR: SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF-- "THEY 
ARE GUILTY." I'M NOT SURE WHO SAID IT, BUT SOMEBODY 
YELLED IT OUT. 
THE COURT: DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THIS WAS 
JUST A JOKING COMMENT. 
JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: YOU DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT TO BE 
PERTAINING TO THIS OR ANY OTHER PARTICULAR CASE; IS 
THAT RIGHT. 
JUROR: YES. ' 
THE COURT: FROM YOUR EXPRESSION, 
MS. MURRAY, I'M ASSUMING THAT YOU FELT IT WAS KIND 
OF A SILLY REMARK AND DID NOT PERTAIN TO THIS CASE; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
JUROR: YES. 
THE COURT: HAS THAT IN ANY WAY INTERFERRED 
WITH YOUR ABILITY TO BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL IN THIS 
CASE. 
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JUROR: NO. 
THE 
TO REFER TO 
CORRECT? 
COURT: 
THIS CASE 
JUROR: THAT 
THE COURT: 
THAT THE BAILIFFS AND 
MENTAL 
BEING 
BEING 
ANY OF 
ABOUT 
OF THE 
DETECTORS HAD 
TRIED 
AND 
TRIED 
IN WHICH 
EVEN IF 
IN WHICH 
THE CASES. IT 
FOURTEEN JUDGES 
CASES 
AND YOU DID NOT UNDERSTAND IT 
IN PARTICULAR; IS 
' S CORRECT. 
ALL OF YOU SHOULD 
THE OFFICERS WHO 
HAVE NO IDEA WHICH 
COURT. 
THAT 
UNDERSTAND 
WERE AT THE 
[ CASES ARE 
THEY DID KNOW WHICH CASES ARE 
COURTS, THEY KNOW NOTHING ABOUT 
WOULD BE TO SAY THERE ARE 
ON THIS FLOOR, AND THAT SOME 
ARE CRIMINAL, SOME OF THEM 
THEY ALL INVOLVE DIFFERENT FACTS. 
AND 
CONVERSATION 
THOSE PEOPLE 
PLEADINGS OR 
[ ARE CIVIL. 
THERE CERTAINLY IS NEVER ANY 
BY THIS 
, NOR DO 
ANYTHING 
COUNSEL, YOU 
COURT OR MY STAFF 
THEY SHARE COPIES 
OF THAT NATURE. 
CERTAINLY HAD NO 
WITH ANYONE AT THE PORTALS, ABOUT THIS 
OTHER? 
MR. 
MS . 
THE 
PARKER: 
REMAL: 
COURT: 
THE STATE DID NOT 
I DID NOT. 
ALL RIGHT. DO YOU 
WITH ANY OF 
OF THE 
CONVERSATION 
CASE OR ANY 
, YOUR HONOR. 
r WANT ME TO 
ASK ANY FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONS OF THE JURORS, MR. 
PARKER. 
NOT 
MS . 
MR. PARKER: 
THE COURT: 
MS. REMAL: 
NO, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. REMAL? 
ONLY, YOUR HONOR, WHETHER OR 
THERE WAS ANY RESPONSE BY ANYBODY TO WHAT 
MURRAY OVERHEARD 
PERSON. 
HEAR 
THE COURT: 
BY ANOTHER BAILIFF OR ANY OTHER 
ALL RIGHT. MS. MURRAY, DID YOU 
ANY OTHER COMMENT IN RESPONSE TO THAT, OR IN 
ADDITION DO THAT. 
WITH 
SORT 
AND 
JUROR: NO. 
THE COURT: 
JUROR: NO. 
THE COURT: 
• 
BY ANYBODY? 
AND YOU DIDN'T DISCUSS THIS 
ANY OF YOUR FELLOW JURORS, OBVIOUSLY. JUST 
OF THOUGHT WAS 
IT WAS NOT TAKEN 
UNDERSTAND YOU TO BE 
TELL 
WORK 
JUROR: YES 
THE COURT: 
EACH AND EVERY 
THAT OCCURS IN 
A SILLY COMMENT THAT YOU HEARD, 
SERIOUSLY BY YOU IS WHAT I 
SAYING; IS THAT CORRECT? 
• 
ALL RIGHT. AND AGAIN, LET ME 
ONE OF YOU THAT YOU KNOW THE 
THIS BUILDING, WHETHER IT'S A 
CIVIL CASE OR CRIMINAL CASE, OR DOMESTIC CASE, IT'S 
IMPORTANT WORK, AND I THINK THAT SOMETIMES SOME 
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PEOPLE DON'T GIVE IT THE SERIOUSNESS IT DESERVES 
BECAUSE THEY TRY TO LIGHTEN THE MOOD. THE REFERENCE 
MS. MURRAY HEARD WAS NOT IN CONNECTION WITH THIS 
CASE IN PARTICULAR, AND IT SOUNDS LIKE IT WAS AN 
ABSOLUTELY STUPID, INSENSITIVE REMARK, CERTAINLY 
SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN MADE. 
BUT I THINK IT'S SAFE TO SAY THAT IT HAD 
NOTHING TO DO WITH THIS CASE, AND THAT IT SHOULD 
NEVER HAVE BEEN MADE IN ANY EVENT. 
BUT I WANT TO BE SURE THAT ALL OF YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT IF YOU FEEL ITS IMPACTS, YOU, 
MS. MURRAY, OR ANY OF YOU IN HEARING ABOUT IT, I 
WANT TO KNOW NOW. DO ANY OF YOU FEEL LIKE IT'S HAD 
ANY EFFECT ON YOU? 
(NO VERBAL RESPONSE.) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND THEY'RE SHAKING 
THEIR HEADS IN THE NEGATIVE. > 
IS THERE ANYTHING FURTHER, MS. REMAL, THAT 
YOU WOULD LIKE ME TO ASK ABOUT THAT. 
MS. REMAL: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND I WILL MAKE 
SURE THAT THE PEOPLE AT THE PORTALS UNDERSTAND THAT 
THEY NEED TO BE CAREFUL ABOUT ANY LEVITY OR 
ATTEMPTS AT LEVITY, AND THAT IS NOT HUMOROUS IN A 
GENERIC FORM AT ALL. ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT APPARENTLY 
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IN RELATION TO THIS CASE, ABOUT WHICH NO 
OF HAD 
ONE COULD 
HAD ANY INFORMATION. IT'S INAPPROPRIATE. 
MS. REMAL: MAY WE APPROACH THE 
THE COURT: YES, CERTAINLY. 
(BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD 
THE COURT: LADIES AND GENTLEMEN 
TO SUGGEST THAT WE TAKE A SHORT BREAK AT 
MOMENT 
YOU TO 
CASE, 
AND I'M GOING TO ASK THE BAILIFF 
THE JURY ROOM, AND ASK YOU NOT TO 
EVEN WITH ONE ANOTHER. I THINK IT 
BENCH? 
.) 
, I'M GOING 
THIS 
TO ESCORT 
DISCUSS THE 
WILL ONLY 
TAKE US ABOUT FIVE OR TEN MINUTES. AND YOU'D COME 
j RIGHT 
1 EXCEPT 
OTHER 
PLEASE 
BACK AFTER THAT. 
BAILIFF: SURE. 
(JURY EXITS COURTROOM.) 
THE COURT: I'M GOING TO ASK EVERYONE 
MR. BELTRAN TO LEAVE THE COURTROOM 
THAN COUNSEL AND THE DEFENDANT. ' IF 
, PLEASE, 
YOU WOULD 
STEP OUT. YOU DON'T HAVE TO, DETECTIVE 
TIMMERMAN. OKAY. 
(COURTROOM CLEARED AS ORDERED.) 
YOU DON'T HAPPEN TO KNOW, STEVE, 
DOWNSTAIRS AT THE DOORS THIS MORNING? 
NO. 
BAILIFF: THE OFFICERS THAT ARE 
THE COURT: (ON PHONE) THIS THE 
WHO WAS 
DOWN THERE, 
JUDGE 
1 LEWIS. HOW ARE YOU DOING? GOOD. I NEED TO KNOW 
2 WHO WAS AT THE DOOR, AND I GUESS WHAT WE'RE TALKING 
3 ABOUT IS THE DOORS ON THE MAIN FLOOR AT THE EAST 
4 ENTRANCE AS YOU COME IN FROM THE DOMED AREA, THAT 
5 AREA, THIS MORNING. 
6 AND I NEED TO HAVE THEM COME UP TO MY 
7 COURTROOM NOW. THERE IS A REAL ISSUE WITH THIS 
8 JURY. ONE OF THE ATTORNEYS IS ASKING FOR A MISTRIAL 
9 BECAUSE APPARENTLY AT LEAST ONE OF THE BAILIFFS AT 
10 THE DOORS MADE SOME COMMENT ABOUT "GUILTY, GUILTY, 
11 GUILTY" AS MY JURORS WERE PASSING BY THIS MORNING. 
12 I WANT THE THREE OFFICERS UP HERE NOW, TO SEE IF WE 
13 NEED TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL. 
14 THIS WAS THIS MORNING AS THE JURORS WERE 
15 BEING BROUGHT UP TO MY COURTROOM ON THE ELEVATORS, 
16 AND THERE WERE THREE MALE BAILIFFS. 
17 I DON'T KNOW WHO THEY WERE. SO IF THERE'S 
18 ANY QUESTION, I WANT THEM ALL BROUGHT UP. AND I 
19 NEED TO HAVE THAT DONE RIGHT NOW. OKAY? THANK YOU. 
2 0 I WANT THEM RIGHT IN MY COURTROOM. I HAVE 
21 GOT A A JURY WAITING, AND I'M LOOKING AT A MISTRIAL 
22 ISSUE. THANKS. BYE. 
23 (COURT CONCLUDES PHONE CONVERSATION.) 
24 THE COURT: THIS OF COURSE UPSETS ME, BUT 
2 5 YOU SHOULD UNDERSTAND, MR. HALE, THAT YOUR ATTORNEY 
HAS RAISED AN IMPORTANT ISSUE FOR US TO DEAL WITH. 
I DON'T WANT FOR YOU TO BE PREJUDICED IN 
ANY WAY. NOW, FOR WHAT IT'S WORTH, AND THIS IS NOT 
THE LAST WORD ON THE SUBJECT, BECAUSE I WANT TO HEAR 
FROM THESE THREE OFFICERS. I AM APPALLED THAT THEY 
WOULD HAVE MADE SUCH A COMMENT, ANY OF THEM, OR ALL 
OF THEM. BUT I HAVE TALKED TO OFFICER HALL, WHO IS 
THE BAILIFF TODAY, AND HE WAS DOWN THERE BASICALLY 
BRINGING UP THE JURORS. HE HEARD NOTHING. 
IS THAT A FAIR COMMENT, OFFICER HALL? 
BAILIFF: THAT'S RIGHT. 
THE COURT: HE WAS AT THE BACK, AS I 
UNDERSTAND IT, SO IT WAS AS HE WAS SHEPHERDING THE 
JURORS UP. OBVIOUSLY, ONLY ONE OF THEM HEARD 
ANYTHING. AND THAT JUROR, TO MY MIND, DID NOT TAKE 
IT SERIOUSLY, DID NOT EQUATE IT WITH THIS CASE AT 
ALL. 
BUT I DO WANT TO MAKE SURE THAT WE HAVE AN 
ADEQUATE UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT WAS SAID, SO THAT WE 
CAN PUT IT INTO PERSPECTIVE. 
BUT IT'S IMPORTANT FOR YOU TO UNDERSTAND, 
MR. HALE, THAT YOUR ATTORNEY HAS MADE A MOTION THAT 
SHE FEELS IS APPROPRIATE, AND I THINK IT'S AN 
APPROPRIATE MOTION TO BE BROUGHT BEFORE THE COURT. 
I HAVE NOT DECIDED HOW I'M GOING TO RULE, BUT I 
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WANTS TO SEE WHAT THESE OFFICERS HAVE TO SAY FOR 
THEMSELVES. WE'LL BRING THEM UP AND TRY TO GLEAN A 
BIT MORE INFORMATION BUT IF I WERE TO GRANT THE 
MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL, MR. HALE, YOU'D GO BACK TO 
JAIL, AND THIS WOULD DELAY YOUR TRIAL. I DON'T KNOW 
HOW LONG IT WOULD DELAY THE TRIAL. 
LET'S LOOK, 
DO IT. WE CAN'T DO 
THE TRIAL IN ONE DAY 
DAYS. LET ME THINK 
MICHELLE, AND SEE WHEN WE COULD 
IT THIS WEEK BECAUSE WE CAN'T DO 
, AND ALL WE SET ASIDE WERE TWO 
A MINUTE. WHAT WERE WE DOING 
WEDNESDAY OF THIS WEEK? 
THE CLERK: WE HAVE A MOTION TO SUPPRESS 
HEARING ON IN-CUSTODY MATTER. MINOR'S SETTLEMENT, 
ONE HOUR MOTION FOR 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
THE COURT: 
THE CLERK: 
SET FOR TWO DAYS. 
MR. PARKER: 
THE COURT: 
MS. REMAL: 
NEXT WEEK, I WILL BE 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT, 
SO WE'VE MATTERS ALL DAY THEN. 
YES . 
WHAT HAVE WE GOT NEXT MONDAY. 
AN IN-CUSTODY CRIMINAL CASE. 
ALL RIGHT. 
YOUR HONOR, BEFORE WE DISCUSS 
ON VACATION. MY NIECE IS 
FLYING IN THURSDAY NIGHT, AND WE'LL BE GONE NEXT 
WEEK. 
THE COURT: SO THAT IS NOT VIABLE. I AM 
NEVER GOING TO DENY AN ATTORNEY VACATION, 
PARTICULARLY ONE WHO DOES CRIMINAL WORK, WHO I'M 
EXPERIENCED ENOUGH TO KNOW BURNS THE CANDLE AT BOTH 
ENDS AND WORKS VERY VERY HARD. I'VE NEVER DENIED 
ANY LAWYER A VACATION; CERTAINLY NOT A CRIMINAL 
LAWYER. 
THE CLERK: SEPTEMBER 7 OR SEPTEMBER 27 
BOTH OF THOSE OR NOT IN-CUSTODY. 
THE COURT: SEPTEMBER 7 IS AVAILABLE, WHICH 
IS A COUPLE WEEKS AWAY, TO STATE THE OBVIOUS. 
SO IF WE CONTINUE IT, THAT'S WHAT WE'RE 
LOOKING AT DOING NOW. I'M GOING TO WAIT, MR. HALE, 
TO ASK HOW YOU FEEL ABOUT THIS UNTIL WE'VE HEARD 
FROM THE OFFICERS IN QUESTION. THEY WILL BE PAYING 
THE COSTS OF THE JURY ALSO, IF WE NEED TO DO A 
MISTRIAL. 
AND THERE WILL BE REPERCUSSIONS IN TERMS OF 
HOW THEY ARE TREATED. AND THAT'S NOTHING TO DO WITH 
THIS CASE, BUT I WANT TO GIVE YOU A CHANCE TO THINK 
ABOUT IT. WITH THAT IN MIND, EVERY DAY IN JAIL IS, 
I AM SURE, A PERIOD OF TIME THAT FEELS A LOT LONGER 
THAN 2 4 HOURS. AND I WANT YOU TO HAVE A CHANCE TO 
VISIT WITH MS. REMAL ABOUT HER PERSPECTIVE ON IT, 
BECAUSE SHE'S VERY EXPERIENCED AND WISE ATTORNEY. 
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AND, FRANKLY, IF SHE'S MAKING A MOTION 
MISTRIAL, I MAY WELL GRANT IT. 
(OFFICERS ENTER COURTROOM 
THE COURT: OKAY. LET'S . 
• ) 
SEE, 
FOR A 
WE HAVE TWO 
OFFICERS PRESENT. CAN I GET YOU GENTLEMEN 
YOUR 
WERE 
NAMES FOR THE RECORD. 
OFFICER: NEIL TWITCHELL. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
OFFICER: MANUEL GALLOWAY 
THE COURT: MR. TWITCHELL 
YOU AT THE DOORS THIS MORNING 
PASSED BY? 
IN A 
HAVE 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: YES. 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: YES. 
THE COURT: DID EITHER OF 
• 
AND MR. 
WHEN MY 
YOU 
JOKING MANNER OR A SERIOUS MANNER 
SAY 
TO STATE 
' "
: 
GALLOWAY, 
JURY 
ANYTHING 
THAT COULD 
BEEN OVERHEARD BY MY JURY OR SOMEONE IN MY JURY 
ABOUT "GUILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY"? 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: JOKING 
CONVERSATION BETWEEN ME AND HIM. 
THE COURT: WHO SAID IT? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: I DID 
MANNER. 
• 
THE COURT: OFFICER TWITCHELL, 
DID YOU DO? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: I SAID TO 
WHAT EXACTLY 
OFFICER 
GALLOWAY 
THE JURY 
GUILTY, < 
YOU 
BY. 
THE 
SAID 
AND 
JURY 
SAYING, ] 
THE 
DON" 
WERE 
MANY 
THE 
JURY 
; JURY 
, "YOU KNOW, IT'S A 
TOGETHER THAT THEY 
GOOD THING WHEN THEY PUT 
DON'T INSTRUCT THEM ON 
3UILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY." 
THE COURT: WHAT DID YOU MEAN? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
THE COURT: I DON' 
• 
OFFICER 
I SAID, 
TWITCHELL: 
PARDON ME? 
T EVEN UNDERSTAND WHAT 
THE JURY WAS WALKING 
"IT'S A GOOD THING WHEN THEY START 
OUT THAT THEY DON' 
REMEMBER, 
PEOPLE--
OFFICER 
OFFICER 
T START THEM OUT BY 
, GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY, SO 
GALLOWAY: 
TWITCHELL: 
T START THE JURIES OUT-
SAYING. HE 
JURORS WHEN 
JURY 
WAS 
WAS 
IS ASKING 
THEY TAKE 
IT DIDN'T PERTAIN--
IT'S GOOD THING THEY 
- OTHERWISE-- IS WHAT WE 
ME, WHY DO WE HAVE SO 
THEM UP TO START WITH. 
THE COURT: DID YOU REFER TO THIS CASE? 
OFFICER 
OFFICER 
GALLOWAY: 
TWITCHELL: 
WAS GOING BY. 
THE COURT: SO YOU 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
FOR OR WHAT IT WAS 
• 
NO . 
NO. I DIDN'T KNOW WHO 
WEREN'T REFERRING TO--
I HAD NO IDEA WHO THE 
PERTAINING-- WHO THE 
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IT AGAIN 
THE COURT: THE NATURE OF THE CHARGES? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
THE COURT: IT WAS 
REPEAT IT AGAIN, 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
THING THEY DON'T START THE . 
DOWN IN 
GUILTY, 
GALLOWAY 
LAUGHING 
IT. 
BACK. 
GUILTY, 
THE ROOM BY SAYING, 
GUILTY, GUILTY.•" 
NO. 
IN THE CONTEXT OF-- SAY 
IF YOU WOULD. 
I SAID, "IT'S A GOOD 
JURY OUT WHEN THEY ARE 
'REMEMBER, GUILTY, 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. AND OFFICER 
, IS THAT THE WAY YOU REMEMBER IT? 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: IT IS, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: DID YOU MAKE ANY RESPONSE? 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: 
I WENT, "GUILTY, 
I JUST SAID -- I WAS 
GUILTY, TO HIM." THAT'S 
THE COURT: YOU SAID, "GUILTY, GUILTY" 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: 
GUILTY." I GOES, "< 
'-
YES. HE SAID, "GUILTY, 
3IILTY, GUILTY, GUILTY," 
NOT LOOKING AT THE JURORS OR NOTHING. 
ALL, THE 
THE COURT: DO YOU 
RAMIFICATIONS THAT 
UNDERSTAND, FIRST OF 
THIS HAS? DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT ONE OF MY JURORS HEARD THIS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: NO, I DID NOT. 
THE COURT: I AM TELLING YOU NOW. DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT A LAWYER OVERHEARD IT AND CALLED IT 
TO OUR ATTENTION? DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE 
SIGNIFICANCE OF THIS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: I CAN SEE WHERE THAT 
WOULD BE A PROBLEM. 
THE COURT: IT'S A HUGE PROBLEM. AND YOU 
BOTH STRIKE ME AS INTELLIGENT OFFICERS WHO ARE VERY 
CONCERNED ABOUT DOING A GOOD JOB. I HAVE SEEN 
ENOUGH OF BOTH OF YOU TO KNOW YOU ARE EXTREMELY 
CONSCIENTIOUS IN DOING YOUR DUTY, AND YOU ARE VERY 
GENTEEL AND CIVIL WITH THE PUBLIC, AND WITH 
ATTORNEYS, AND THE PEOPLE WHO USE THE BUILDING. BUT 
THIS IS A VERY SERIOUS MATTER. 
MS. REMAL, IT SEEMS TO BE CLEAR NOW THAT 
THIS WAS IN THE CONTEXT OF GENERAL COMMENT ABOUT HOW 
IMPORTANT IT WAS THAT JURORS NOT BE TOLD ANYTHING 
ABOUT NOT GUILTY OR GUILTY GUILTY GUILTY, BUT 
APPARENTLY THOSE WORDS WERE USED. APPARENTLY THE 
ONE JUROR WHO HEARD IT HEARD THE WORD GUILTY. I 
DON'T-- THE JUROR WAS CLEAR THAT SHE DID NOT FORM 
AN OPINION AS A RESULT OF THAT, NOR DID SHE 
CORRELATE THOSE REMARKS OR THOSE WORDS-- I SHOULD 
SAY, WITH THIS CASE, OR TAKE THEM TO HEART. 
ALL RIGHT. DO YOU HAVE A MOTION? 
MS. REMAL: MAY I CONFER WITH MR. HALE FOR 
JUST A MOMENT HERE. 
THE COURT: YES. YOU CERTAINLY MAY. 
(COUNSEL CONFERS WITH DEFENDANT OFF THE 
RECORD.) 
THE COURT: DETECTIVE BELTRAN, IF YOU WOULD 
DO THE SAME THING WITH THIS INDIVIDUAL. 
MS. REMAL: 
THE COURT: 
MS. REMAL: 
YOUR HONOR, BASED ON 
IT DOESN'T APPEAR AS 
YOUR HONOR, I DO HAVE A MOTION. 
THE MOTION IS? 
IT IS MY MOTION FOR A MISTRIAL, 
THE OFFICERS' UNDERSTANDING. 
THOUGH THEY WERE INTENTIONALLY 
OR MALICIOUSLY TRYING TO CAUSE A PROBLEM. 
UNFORTUNATELY, USING THE WORDS "GUILTY, GUILTY, 
GUILTY", THOSE ARE THE WORDS THAT THE JUROR 
OVERHEARD. ALTHOUGH 
TAKE IT SERIOUSLY. 
SHE INDICATED THAT SHE DIDN'T 
MY CONCERN WITH JURORS, ALWAYS, AND I KNOW 
THE APPELLATE COURTS 
TERMS OF VOIR DIRE, : 
VERY HARD TO FOLLOW : 
VERY HARD TO BE GOOD 
SOMETIMES INFLUENCES 
HAVE TALKED ABOUT THIS JUST IN 
ES THAT WE KNOW THAT PEOPLE TRY 
INSTRUCTIONS, WE KNOW THEY TRY 
JURORS, BUT THAT THERE'S 
THAT HAVE AN UNCONSCIOUS OR 
SUBCONSCIOUS INFLUENCE ON PEOPLE, EVEN THOUGH THEY 
MAY TRY TO SET THINGS ASIDE. 
THIS IS A CASE WHERE THERE'S AN 
IDENTIFICATION ISSUE, AND MY CONCERN IS THAT IF IT 
COMES TO A CLOSE DECISION BY JURORS, THAT THEY MAY 
BE INFLUENCED BY THAT. PARTICULARLY THE JUROR WHO 
OVERHEARD. MY SPECIAL CONCERN IS THAT THIS IS NOT A 
COMMENT MADE BY SOME LAY PERSON, CITIZEN, THEY HAVE 
NO IDEA WHO THEY ARE, BUT BY UNIFORMED OFFICERS WHO 
HAVE AN OFFICIAL CAPACITY HERE IN THIS BUILDING. 
NOT AT PART OF OUR STAFF, BUT IN THE BUILDING. 
AND MY CONCERN IS THAT THEY MAY THINK THE 
OFFICERS MUST KNOW SOMETHING, THEY WORK IN THIS 
BUILDING EVERY DAY, THEY SEE WHAT HAPPENS. AND FOR 
THOSE REASONS, I MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL. 
THE COURT: MR. PARKER, DO YOU WANT TO 
RESPOND? 
MR. PARKER: WELL, I DO, YOUR HONOR. I 
ACKNOWLEDGE, FIRST OF ALL THE LAW IS AS MS. REMAL 
INDICATES. AND THAT IS, THAT THERE IS' SOME FEELING, 
I BELIEVE, IN THE COURTS THAT IF THERE IS THE 
APPEARANCE OF EVIL, THAT THINGS ARE STRUCK. 
THE COURT: FIRST OF ALL, I'M NOT SURE YOU 
CAN DEEM WHAT HAPPENED AS THE APPEARANCE OF EVIL, 
BUT I GUESS I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE SAYING. 
MS. REMAL HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT SHE DOES 
NOT UNDERSTAND THAT THE COMMENT OR COMMENTS WERE 
MADE IN ANY KIND OF MALICIOUS MANNER. FURTHER, ONLY 
1 ONE JUROR HEARD IT. THE JUROR WHO HEARD IT WAS VERY 
2 CLEAR, AS I UNDERSTAND IT, AND WE CAN CERTAINLY 
3 QUESTION FURTHER, THAT THEY DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE 
4 REMARK TO HAVE ANY BEARING ON THIS CASE. THAT IT 
5 HAD NOT IMPACTED HER FEELINGS ABOUT THE CASE AT ALL, 
6 THAT SHE UNDERSTOOD --AT LEAST IT'S MY PERCEPTION 
7 OF WHAT SHE'S SAID, AND WE CAN CLARIFY THIS, TO BE 
8 SORT OF A LIGHTHEARTED COMMENT THAT WAS NOT RELATED 
9 TO THIS CASE. 
10 I INTERRUPTED YOU. GO ON. 
11 MR. PARKER: I APPRECIATE THE COURT'S 
12 ARGUMENT. BUT THAT'S WHERE I WAS GOING. I WANTED 
13 TO INDICATE THAT I DIDN'T FEEL THAT WAS A 
14 CIRCUMSTANCE THAT AMOUNTED TO THAT. 
15 IN FACT, IN A BROAD WAY I AM WORRIED THAT 
16 THE PREJUDICE, IF ANY, THAT COMES OUT OF THIS 
17 ACTUALLY REFERS TO THE STATE. AND THE MANNER THAT 
18 IT WAS TAKEN BY THIS JUROR, I THINK THAT, IF 
19 ANYTHING, THAT SHE COULD WORRY ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY 
20 OF OFFICERS IN GENERAL. NOT SPECIFICALLY ABOUT THE 
21 DEFENDANT. 
22 I GUESS MY RESPONSE IS, THAT, ONE, AS THE 
23 COURT BROUGHT OUT, IT WASN'T DIRECTED AT ALL ABOUT 
24 THIS DEFENDANT. THEY HAD NO KNOWLEDGE OF IT. IT 
2 5 WASN'T AN INTENTIONAL COMMENT, IT WASN'T 
INTENTIONALLY MEANT, IT WAS JUST AN ACCIDENT. 
MS. REMAL: IT WAS. 
THE COURT: IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO IN ANY 
WAY INTERFERE WITH JUSTICE, CLEARLY. THE OFFICERS 
ARE PROFESSIONALS WHO HAD NO INTENTION OF DOING ANY 
HARM, BUT IT WAS MADE INTENTIONALLY. THAT IS TO 
SAY, CERTAINLY THE WORDS CAME OUT OF THE 
MOUTHS ON PURPOSE. 
THEIR 
MR. PARKER: CERTAINLY. AND I'M NOT 
INDICATING THAT IT WAS OTHER THAN THAT. BUT IT WAS 
NOT LIKE THE OFFICERS HAD TRIED TO TALK TO THE 
PANEL. IT WAS NOT LIKE THE OFFICERS HAD TRIED TO DO 
SOMETHING SO DELIBERATELY SO THE PANEL COULD HEAR 
AND INFLUENCED. IT WAS ACCIDENTAL, OR INCIDENTAL. 
IT WAS SURELY A STUPID COMMENT AND SURELY 
INAPPROPRIATE, BUT IN THE CONTEXT OF WHO 
IN THE CONTEXT OF NOT KNOWING OUR PANEL, 
THEY ARE, 
NOT KNOWING 
OUR FACTS, AND THAT OF THE JURORS THEMSELVES, THE 
ONLY ONE THAT HEARD IT TOOK IT VERY LIGHTLY, SAID 
THAT IT WOULD NOT INFLUENCE HER, TOOK IT 
AN INAPPROPRIATE JOKE. 
I JUST DON'T THINK THAT EQUATES 
PREJUDICE IN THIS CASE THAT WOULD IN ANY 
ALMOST AS 
TO THE 
WAY 
INFLUENCE HER DECISION OR HER ABILITY, REGARDLESS OF 
HOW CLOSE THE CASE IS. 
1 THE COURT: WHAT DO YOU BELIEVE THE COURT'S 
2 REMARKS DID BY WAY OF HAVING AN IMPACT ON THIS? DO 
3 YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY HARM MAY HAVE BEEN AMELIORATED 
4 OR EXACERBATED? 
5 MR. PARKER: I THINK THE COURT HANDLED IT 
6 APPROPRIATELY IN THE BROAD WAY IT WAS ADDRESSED. 
7 AND THAT THE COURT'S INDICATION THAT THE 
8 COMMENT WAS SURELY A STUPID COMMENT THAT SHOULD NOT 
9 HAVE BEEN MADE. WE CAN SURELY MAKE A FURTHER 
10 INSTRUCTION IF THE COURT WANTS THAT. IN NO WAY CAN 
11 ANYONE CONDONE SUCH A THING, BUT I AM NOT SURE 
12 THAT'S APPROPRIATE. WE KEEP DIGGING THE PIT AND 
13 MAKING IT WORSE. 
14 THE COURT: THE MORE WE FOCUS ON IT AT THIS 
15 POINT, THE MORE ATTENTION WE DRAW TO IT, IS MY 
16 CONCERN. LET ME SAY ONE MORE THING. I COULD HAVE 
17 TAKEN THE ONE JUROR WHO HEARD IT ASIDE", ON THE 
18 RECORD, TAKING OTHERS OUT. I PURPOSELY CHOSE NOT TO 
19 DO THAT, BECAUSE IT HAS BEEN MY EXPERIENCE THAT 
2 0 SOMETIMES PEOPLE DO NOT IMMEDIATELY RECALL HEARING 
21 SOMETHING, AND THEN WHEN THEIR MEMORIES ARE 
22 REFRESHED AS TO WHAT IT WAS, THEN THEY THINK, OH, 
23 YEAH, I HEARD THAT TOO. AND I DIDN'T WANT THAT 
24 ISSUE TO COME UP. I WANTED TO BE CLEAR THAT 
2 5 WHATEVER WAS HEARD BY ONE, NEEDED TO BE REVIEWED 
WITH ALL OF THEM. SO IF THE ONE WOULD REFERENCE IT 
TO THE OTHERS, OR IF THAT OCCURRED, THAT THEY 
WOULDN'T-- THAT WE WOULD KNOW HOW IT WOULD IMPACT 
THEM. AND I WANTED TO BE SURE THAT WE PRESSED THEM 
TO FIND OUT WHAT THEY REMEMBERED. 
I, FRANKLY, MADE VISUAL OBSERVATIONS, AS 
WELL AS MAKING A RECORD AS TO WHAT WAS SAID ABOUT 
THE EFFECT OF THE WORDS ON THE JURORS, AND THEY DID 
NOT APPEAR, IN MY OPINION -- AND I WILL ASK BOTH 
COUNSEL TO COMMENT ON THIS --TO TAKE IT SERIOUSLY 
IN ANY WAY. 
MR. PARKER, WHAT IS YOUR OPINION OF THE 
REFERENCE?. 
MR. PARKER: I AGREE WITH THAT. NOT ONLY 
BECAUSE OF THE WORDS THE JUROR SPOKE, BUT THERE WAS 
NO SHAKING OF HEADS, NO EITHER SIGN DISGUST OR 
LIGHTHEARTEDNESS ON THE OTHER JURORS'- PART. THEY 
JUST SAT AND LISTENED. I DON'T THINK IT AFFECTED 
THEM AT ALL. 
THE COURT: MS. REMAL, DO YOU HAVE A 
PERSPECTIVE ON THIS FURTHER? 
MS. REMAL: I DIDN'T NOTICE THE OTHER 
JURORS MAKING ANY PARTICULAR FACIAL EXPRESSIONS ONE 
WAY OR THE OTHER. WHICH SEEMS CONSISTENT WITH THEIR 
ANSWER THAT THEY HAVEN'T HEARD ANYTHING. 
MS. REMAL: I HAVEN'T DECIDED HOW I AM 
GOING TO HANDLE THIS. I'M GOING TO THINK ABOUT IT 
FOR FIVE MINUTES BEFORE I MAKE MY RULING. THERE IS 
A TREMENDOUS COST INVOLVED WITH BRINGING IN A NEW 
PANEL. IT'S LIKE $18 PER JUROR, AND WE HAD 
SOMETHING LIKE 2 6 JURORS. AND THEN THERE'S MILEAGE 
COSTS, AND WE HAVE TO START ALL OVER AGAIN TO BRING 
INTO ANOTHER 26. MEANWHILE, THE DEFENDANT IS HELD 
IN JAIL ANOTHER TWO WEEKS, WHICH IS EXTREMELY UNFAIR 
TO THE DEFENDANT. 
BUT MY UNDERSTANDING, MR. HALE, IS THAT 
THAT'S WHAT YOU WANT. YOU WANT TO HAVE A NEW JURY 
PANEL BROUGHT IN; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, I BELIEVE SO. 
THE COURT: WHY? 
THE DEFENDANT: I JUST FEEL THAT THE ISSUE, 
WITH THE WAY IT WAS BROUGHT OUT, HOW EVERYONE--
IT'S JUST IT'S SO EMBEDDED IN THEIR MINDS. 
THE COURT: WHO SAID THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: IF I WAS ON A JURY, AND I 
WOULD THINK THAT THEY ARE MAKING THIS BIG DEAL OF 
WHAT HAPPENED, AND THAT'S HOW I WOULD FEEL, THAT 
THERE MUST BE A REASON FOR IT. I JUST THINK IT 
WOULD AFFECT ME THAT WAY. AND I'M GOING ALONG WITH 
WHAT MY LAWYER FEELS, AS WELL. AND I'M PUTTING MY 
TRUST IN HER HANDS. 
THE COURT: AND SHE'S A FINE LAWYER. I 
UNDERSTAND WHERE YOU'RE COMING FROM. ALL RIGHT. 
THANK YOU, SIR. YOU UNDERSTAND THAT THIS IS GOING 
TO RESULT IN A DELAY IF I GRANT A MISTRIAL, BUT 
NOTHING IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN YOUR HAVING A FAIR 
TRIAL. DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT? 
THE DEFENDANT: YES, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. I'M GOING TO TAKE 
FIVE MINUTES AND THINK ABOUT THIS. I'M GOING TO ASK 
COUNSEL TO STEP OUT. I'M GOING TO ASK SARGEANT 
BELTRAN TO TAKE THE DEFENDANT BACK INTO THE HOLDING 
CELL. AND I'M GOING TO ASK THE OFFICERS TO REMAIN 
BEHIND, AS WELL AS THE COURT REPORTER AND MY TWO 
OFFICERS. 
(COURTROOM CLEARED AS DIRECTED.) 
THE COURT: OKAY. WITHOUT MILEAGE WE ARE 
TALKING ABOUT $468. PLUS THAT DOESN'T TAKE INTO 
ACCOUNT THE LAWYERS' TIME, MY TIME, COUNSEL'S TIME. 
NOT ONLY THAT, BUT ALL THE PERSONNEL'S 
TIME. AND THEN IT'S NOT JUST $468, IT'S MILEAGE, 
WHICH I HAD NO IDEA WHAT IT IS. THEN IT'S DOUBLE 
BECAUSE WE'RE DOING IT ALL OVER AGAI IF I GRANT THE 
MISTRIAL. 
WE HAVE NOW LOST, EVEN IF I DON'T GRANT THE 
MISTRIAL, ABOUT AN HOUR, BY THE TIME THIS IS TAKEN 
CARE OF. AND THERE IS A HUGE ISSUE ON APPEAL THAT 
LAWYERS WILL SPEND LOTS OF TIME BRIEFING AND WILL 
ADD TO THE APPELLATE ISSUES THAT GO UP. AND IF THE 
COURT OF APPEALS FINDS THAT I ERRED IN NOT GRANTING 
THE MISTRIAL, IF THAT'S WHAT I DECIDE TO DO, THEN 
THE CASE WILL HAVE TO BE RE-TRIED. 
AND SO THAT WILL HAVE COST US THE EXPENSE 
OF NOT ONLY BRINGING IN ANOTHER JURY AND BRINGING 
THE WITNESSES BACK, BUT WE HAVE TO GO THROUGH THE 
ORDEAL OF TESTIFYING AGAIN. BUT THERE IS A HUGE 
COST IN CONNECTION WITH APPEAL. AND AT THE VERY 
LEAST, THERE'S A HUGE APPELLATE ISSUE. 
I WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU UNDERSTAND HOW 
SIGNIFICANT THIS IS, WHETHER I GRANT THE APPEAL --
OR EXCUSE ME, THE MISTRIAL OR NOT. 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THAT, OFFICERS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: YES, MA'AM. 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: YES. 
THE COURT: THIS ISN'T HUMOROUS. 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: IT WAS NOT INTENDED TO 
IN ANY WAY AFFECT THOSE PEOPLE. 
THE COURT: IF YOU WERE BAD OFFICERS, I 
WOULDN'T EVEN BOTHER TALKING ABOUT IT WITH YOU. BUT 
YOU'RE NOT; YOU'RE BOTH VERY FINE OFFICERS. THAT'S 
WHY I AM TAKING THE TIME TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU, 
BECAUSE I WANT YOU TO BE EVEN BETTER OFFICERS. 
IT'S A BIG DEAL, WHATEVER IS SAID AT THE 
GATES, BECAUSE PEOPLE PAY ATTENTION TO IT. PEOPLE 
IN UNIFORM. AND IN FACT, THE MORE PROFESSIONAL YOU 
ARE, THE MORE IT TENDS TO BE OBSERVED. YOU BOTH 
APPEAR TO BE, IN MY EXPERIENCE, VERY FINE OFFICERS. 
SO I'M TAKING THE TIME TO TELL YOU THIS 
CANNOT EVER OCCUR AGAIN. AND YOU NEED TO TELL YOUR 
COLLEAGUES, THAT WHAT THEY SAY, EVEN IN A 
LIGHTHEARTED, JOKING MANNER, IS NOT INSIGNIFICANT. 
OBVIOUSLY THE PUBLIC IS GOING TO PAY 
ATTENTION TO IT, AND IT'S GOING TO GET BACK TO ME. 
I DON'T WANT TO DECLARE A MISTRIAL, BUT I ALSO KNOW 
AT THIS POINT IT'S GOING TO BE AN ISSUE IF I DON'T. 
SO I NEED TO THINK ABOUT IT. AND TWO THINGS I NEED 
TO DO IS, I NEED TO QUICKLY DEAL WITH THIS ISSUE AND 
TRY TO DO IT IN A WAY THAT CREATES FEWER ISSUES ON 
APPEAL. ASSUMING THERE IS A CONVICTION. 
OBVIOUSLY, IT COULD ALSO THE IMPACT THE 
JURY NEGATIVE TO THE PROSECUTION, WHERE THEY THINK, 
GEE, THERE'S AN ISSUE AND MAYBE WE OUGHT TO BEND 
OVER BACKWARDS TO MAKE SURE WE GIVE HIM THE BENEFITS 
OF THE DOUBT. SO I JUST WANT YOU TO BE CLEAR THAT 
I'M NOT SAYING YOU ARE BAD OFFICERS. TO THE 
CONTRARY, I HAVE A LOT OF RESPECT 
I KNOW HOW HARD YOUR 
HAVE TIME ON YOUR HANDS WHEN 
REALLY HARD, AND OTHER TIMES 
JOB 
FOR BOTH OF YOU. 
IS. I KNOW YOU 
YOU'RE NOT WORKING 
WHEN YOU'RE REALLY 
UNDER THE GUN, WORKING VERY HARD AND DEALING WITH 
DIFFICULT AND COMPLEX ISSUES. 
PLEASE DON'T DO THIS 
WORD ON THIS? 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
APOLOGIES TO THE COURT. 
AGAIN. DO I HAVE YOUR 
YES, 
THE COURT: ENOUGH SAID. 
THE WORD THAT JUDGE LEWIS WAS 
BUT THIS IS A VERY BIG DEAL. 
GENTLEMAN. 
OFFICER TWITCHELL: 
NOT 
AND MY SINCERE 
BUT PLEASE PASS 
UNKIND ABOUT IT. 
OKAY. THANK YOU, 
THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
OFFICER GALLOWAY: THANK YOU, MA'AM. 
THE COURT: I'M TAKING FIVE MINUTES TO 
THINK ABOUT IT. 
(COURT IN RECESS BRIEFLY AT 2:3 5 P.M.) 
(COURT RESUMES SESSION AT 2:40 P.M. OUT OF 
THE PRESENCE OF THE JURY.) 
THE COURT: OFFICER, 
TAKE THEM OUT IN THE HALL FOR 
CAN 
ONE 
I ASK YOU TO JUST 
MOMENT. JUST ONE 
SECOND. WE'LL BRING THE DEFENDANT IN, AND MAKE SURE 
WE HAVE GOT OFFICER TIMMERMAN IN, AND THEN WE'LL 
START. 
(DEFENDANT NOW PRESENT.) 
MR. HALE, I'M GOING TO DENY THE MOTION. I 
WANT TO TELL YOU AHEAD OF TIME. EXCUSE ME. I HAVE 
A PIECE OF CANDY IN MY MOUTH. VERY UNPROFESSIONAL. 
BUT I WANTED TO TELL YOU AHEAD OF TIME, I DON'T 
THINK IN ANY WAY IT'S GOING TO INTERFERE WITH YOUR 
RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL. 
AND I THOUGHT ABOUT IT AND CONSIDERED IT, 
AND IF I THOUGHT IT WOULD HAVE ANY IMPACT, I WOULD 
HAVE GRANTED THE MOTION. BUT I DON'T THINK IT WILL. 
AND THIS MAY BE AN ISSUE ON APPEAL IF YOU'RE 
CONVICTED. AND YOU MAY NOT BE CONVICTED. 
SO I HAVE CONSIDERED IT. I JUST FEEL, 
GIVEN THE RESPONSE OF THE ONE JUROR, THAT IT'S NOT 
HAD AN IMPACT. BUT I WANTED YOU TO KNOW AHEAD OF 
TIME. '-
ALL RIGHT. LET'S BRING IN THE JURY. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONTINUE IN PRESENCE OF JURY.) 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. 
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, COUNSEL AND THE COURT 
HAVE BEEN TALKING ABOUT A VARIETY OF ISSUES WE NEED 
TO DEAL WITH. ISSUES LIKE JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND 
OTHER THINGS. WE TRY TO COORDINATE WITNESSES SO 
THAT WE CAN GET THEM ON WHEN THEY ARE ABLE TO 
APPEAR, AND WE'VE DEALT WITH ALL OF THAT. SO EXCUSE 
US, BUT I THINK THE TIME HAS BEEN WELL USED. 
SO THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE. 
LET ME JUST ASK: DID ANYONE DISCUSS THE 
CASE WHILE YOU WERE OUT OF THE COURTROOM, OR FORM ON 
OPINION? NO HANDS ARE RAISED. 
ALL RIGHT, COUNSEL. LET'S PROCEED AND CALL 
YOUR FIRST WITNESS. 
THE COURT: STATE WILL CALL MITCHELL LEWIS. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU LIKE LIKE A GLASS OF 
WATER? OKAY. 
MITCHELL LEWIS 
CALLED BY THE PLAINTIFF, BEING DULY 
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS: 
THE CLERK: YOU DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT THE 
TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE IN THE- CASE NOW 
BEFORE THE COURT WILL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH 
AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, SO HELP YOU GOD? 
THE WITNESS: I DO. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q. IF YOU'D SPEAK RIGHT INTO THE MICROPHONE 
AND ADJUST THAT SO IT'S RIGHT IN FRONT OF YOU. 
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AUGUST 20, 1999 
r > R 0 C 
(COMMENCING 
THE COURT: 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 
E E D I N G S 
AT 4:00 O'CLOCK P.M. ) 
OKAY. WE ARE HERE IN THE 
MATTER OF STATE OF UTAH VERSUS JASON 
WE' 
TO 
ROSS HALE. 
RE HERE IN CONNECTION WITH A HEARING PRELIMINARY 
THE TRIAL ON MONDAY. AND MY UNDERSTANDING IS 
THIS HAS TO DO WITH ESTABLISHING SOME 
BASIS FOR EYE-WITNESS MATERIAL, AND A 
BY THE COURT 
EXCLUDED. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
AS TO WHETHER THAT'S TO 
PARKER: 
COURT: 
THAT'S CORRECT, 
ALL RIGHT. YOU 
". DEFENDANT IS PRESENT WITH COUNSEL 
MS . 
SOME WRITING 
ONE 
BE 
MR. 
HE 
REMAL: I HAVE PROVIDED 
MATERIALS, AND WOULD ASK 
1 HAND UNCUFFED. 
THE 
FREE . 
MS . 
THE 
PARKER? 
MR . 
COURT: 
REMAL: 
COURT: 
PARKER: 
YES. THE RIGHT 
THANK YOU. 
FOUNDATIONAL 
> DETERMINATION 
BE INCLUDED OR 
YOUR HONOR. 
MAY PROCEED. 
• 
MR. HALE WITH 1 
. THAT HE HAVE 
HAND NEEDS TO | 
WHO ARE YOUR WITNESSES, 
STATE HAS ONLY 
IS MR. MITCH LEWIS. 
ONE WITNESS. 
FORWARD 
THE 
, SIR, 
3 
COURT: MR. LEWIS, IF YOU WOULD COME 
AND WE'LL SWEAR YOU IN. 
MITCHELL LEWIS 
CALLED BY THE PLAINTIFF, BEING DULY 
SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS FOLLOWS 
THE CLERK: YOU DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR THAT 
TESTIMONY YOU ARE ABOUT TO GIVE IN THE CASE NOW 
BEFORE 
1 
THE 
THE COURT WILL BE THE TRUTH, THE WHOLE TRUTH 
AND NOTHING BUT THE TRUTH, SO HELP YOU GOD? 
Q. 
THE 
MR. 
WITNESS: I DO. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
LEWIS, THE MIC DOES AMPLIFY, SO IF YOU 
WILL ADJUST YOURSELF SO YOU ARE RIGHT IN FRONT IT, 
AND SPEAK UP 
A. 
-
 :
'
 :
 Q. 
A. 
Q. 
COUNTY? 
A. 
1
 Q. 
EVENTS 
SO EVERYONE CAN HEAR YOU. 
STATE YOUR FULL NAME, PLEASE. 
MITCHELL REGIS LEWIS. 
WOULD YOU SPELL YOUR LAST NAME? 
L. E. W. I. S. 
NOW, 
YES 
NOW 
, ARE YOU A RESIDENT OF SALT LAKE 
, I AM. 
LET ME CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO SOME 
THAT OCCURRED ON MARCH 19, OF THIS YEAR, 
1999. DO YOU REMEMBER THOSE EVENTS? 
2 I A Y E i ] , i" . . •;.;• 
3 J Q. ABOUT WHAT TIME DID THEY START? 
A, Al' 14, " I \M\ J I* 11 i I I I "i . 
Q # I S T H A I A . M . O K P M :j • 
A . II .i l l'I. 
z . Q. NOW, LET :- MK QUESTIONS ABOUT SOME 
8 * THINGS THAT «* R 
9 1 I N S T A N C E , THE N I G H T B E F O R E . S L E P T ? 
•»
 n
 I ;i - A . ' I ES . 
1 1 I -Q.••••• ABOUT HOW MANY H O U R S ? 
-i o I A . 
^ » Q. NOW, DID YOU GET THE MORNING AT YOUR 
1 A
 I Y O U R U U U A l . CI M ' L ' U M U I I ' T 1 1 \ IN« '" l«I I ,'i : : •' " 
A . "' NO. I HAD A V A C A T I O N DAY THAT D A Y , SO I 
1
 3D 1 iJi i J L E E i ' " I !! '"> I, I "T H , W I T I"1 V " •. ' •. • .' ;; / • •• •  •• 
Q. ABOUT WHAT TIME DID YOU GET UP? 
A , m l ! Il I Ill '" II" U K M K M M K K IK « \ i !' I. V 
W A S A B 0 U I B : ' i < » " O I . 0 « ' ¥
 ( * » R S <'» 
0 . in i 'i in ' 1 1 Mi 1< in i i in i ORUGS 
EITHER THE DAY BEFORE . THAT DAY? 
A. . 
FACT, DO YOU TAKE ANY PRESCRIPTION 
Q. 
BEFORE 
A. 
DAY. 
Q. 
A. 
_ / 
DID YOU TAKE THOSE DRUGS EITHER THE DAY 
OR THAT DAY? 
YES. THERE'S A COUPLE THAT I TAKE EVERY 
WHAT DRUGS ARE THOSE? 
ONE IS ZOLOFT AND THE OTHER ONE IS 
PROPANALOL. 
Q. 
A. 
WHAT DO THOSE DRUGS DO? 
THE ZOLOFT IS AN ANTIDEPRESSANT, AND THE. 
PROPRANALOL IS A MIGRAINE PREVENTION MEDICATION. 
Q. DO EITHER OF THOSE INTERFERE AT ALL WITH 
YOUR ABILITY TO THINK AND TO SEE AND TO TALK? 
A. 
• Q. 
LITTLE 
NO. NOT AT ALL. 
DO THEY HELP YOU ACTUALLY? ARE THINGS A 
CLEARER OR A LITTLE MORE PERCEPTIBLE WHEN YOU 
HAVE THOSE DRUGS? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
I NOTICE YOU'RE WEARING GLASSES TODAY. 
YES. 
DID YOU ALSO WEAR GLASSES BACK ON MARCH 19? 
YES, I DID. 
AND WHEN THIS EVENTS OCCURRED WERE YOU 
WEARING THOSE GLASSES? 
A. 
Q-
YES . 
AND CAN YOU SEE CLEARLY WHEN YOU HAVE YOUR 
GLASSES ON? 
A. YES. VKUY 1'L.KARLY 
Q. FOR INSTANCE, IF 
COURTROOM, » " 
A. YES, VERY MUCH. 
Q. BOTH THOSE 
AWAY * 
A. YES. 
Q. NOW, DID THERE COME 
ANY OF THIS EVENT THA' 
K AROUND THIS 
LL URING 
ALL? 
A. NOT 
DON'T REMEMBER HAVING THEM OFF FOR, YOU KNOW, 
GREAT LENGTH 1 . > 
RUB MY EYES, OR WHATEVER, BUT I WOULD HAVE PUT THEM 
RIGHT BACK ON. 
• Q . 1. E T 
m? TUT; 
rii£ CORNING. 
A . 
II-1 D 
S TALK ABOUT 
WAS •: = 
/EATHER- • 
LEATHER, 
YOU HAVE ANY 
THE EVEN. ITSELF AND SOME 
1
 » ? -
- WHAT WAS THE WEATHER 
BEAUTIFUL SPRING DAY. 
DIFFICULTY SEEING ANYTHING 
DURING 
A. 
' "'
 Q
 ' 
OR ANY 
A. 
'••• Q . 
——. J 
THAT DAY? 
NO. 
DID YOU HAVE ANY PROBLEMS WITH YOUR HEARING 
OTHER PARTS OF YOUR BODY ON THAT DAY? 
NO. 
NOW, LET ME CALL YOUR ATTENTION TO WHEN 
THIS EVENT STARTED. WHERE WERE YOU JUST PRIOR TO IT 
STARTING? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
SITTING IN MY VEHICLE IN SUGARHOUSE PARK. 
WHY WERE YOU THERE? 
I WENT TO ENJOY LUNCH AND READ A NEWSPAPER. 
WHERE WERE YOU WITH ANYONE OR WERE YOU BY 
YOURSELF? 
A. 
Q. 
I WAS BY MYSELF. 
WAS THERE ANYTHING THAT, PRIOR TO THE EVENT 
STARTING, THAT WAS -- THAT HAD EITHER TROUBLED YOU 
OR THAT YOU WERE ANXIOUS ABOUT? 
A . 
WHEN I 
ONLY MINUTES BEFORE THE EVENT STARTED IS 
NOTICED SOMETHING IN MY REAR VIEW MIRROR, AND 
THAT WAS THE FIRST I WAS AWARE OF ANYTHING THAT 
WOULD-
Q. 
FIRST 1 
ANYTHING UNUSUAL. 
LET'S GO TO THAT EVENTS. WHAT WAS THE 
JNUSUAL THING THAT CALLED YOUR ATTENTION TO 
THIS EVENTS? 
A. I GUESS IT'S NOT UNUSUAL TO SEE PEOPLE IN 
REAR VIEW MIRROP - ! THAT' CTUALLY HOW 
BEGAN. T ^LANCEI 
MIRROR AND x LJ.~ ">'.IVIDUALS SOME DISTANCE 
BEHIND MY CAR, APPRO/* S. 
y. «.ix^  COULD YOU SEE THEIR FACES AS 
THEIR FULL BODIES 
'
 ::E MIRROR? 
T nmT.i REMEMl 
MUCK wr THEIR BODIES WERE VISIBLE, BUT THERE WERE 
DEFINITELY TWO PEO. . • . 
HOW LONG DID YOU LOOK A" iiKM THAT FIRST 
GLANCE? 
A. PROBABLY JUST SECONDS, VERY SHORTLY ftND T 
WENT BACK ^O READING. 
y. AND WHAT WAS THE NEXT THING THAT YOU 
NOTICED? 
A. THE NEXT THING I WAS AWARE V i THAT THEY 
PASSED MY VE1: . T . ... . 
Q. .,_ LOOK •  ; -:.v PASSED? 
•A'."" 
Q. HOW CLOSE TO YOUR CAR AND > WHERE YOU WERE 
!.'L-! A T l'111 W K I,1 li' I'll.1 T i i i i ' V /i " T I I I . ' V n ,i\ \i <-' w i i •< 
A. THEY WERE VERY CLOSE. I WOULD SAY WITHIN 
SEVERAL FEET OF MY CAR. 
Q. HOW LONG DID YOU LOOK AT THEM THAT TIME? 
A. 
DIDN'T 
CLOSE 
AGAIN, THAT WAS A PRETTY SHORT GLANCE. I 
SEE FACES AT THAT POINT BECAUSE THEY WERE 
ENOUGH TO THE CAR, AS I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW, 
YOU KNOW, THE TOP OF THE WINDOW PREVENTED ME FROM 
SEEING THEIR UPPER BODIES. BUT I DID SEE THEM IN 
PASSING THE CAR. 
Q. WHAT WAS THE NEXT THING THAT CALLED YOUR 
ATTENTION TO THOSE TWO PEOPLE? 
••: A . 
UP AND 
MAYBE 
AGAIN, I WENT BACK TO READING, AND I LOOKED 
SAW THE TWO INDIVIDUALS IN FRONT OF MY CAR, 
100 FEET OR SO, AND THEY'D TURNED AROUND AND 
WERE HEADING BACK TOWARDS MY CAR. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q • 
AND WERE THEY FACING YOU AT THAT TIME? 
YES . 
COULD YOU SEE THEIR FACES? 
YES. 
AND HOW LONG DID YOU LOOK AT THEM ON THAT 
OCCASION? 
:A, 
DIDN'T 
POINT. 
THERE' 
DIDN'T 
AGAIN, IT PROBABLY WASN'T TOO LONG. I-- I 
REALLY-- I WASN'T REALLY FRIGHTENED AT THAT 
I JUST -- YOU KNOW, IT WAS A PUBLIC PARK, 
S PEOPLE WALKING BY ALL THE TIME. IT JUST 
YOU KNOW JUST DIDN'T CAUSE ME GREAT 
CONCERN AT THAT POINT. I WENT BACK TO READING MY 
NEWSPAPER. 
8 
9 
X 3 
2 
2 , 
2^ 
WHEN NEXT DID YOU SEE THEM? 
THE NEXT • i THE 
DRIVER'S SIDE WINDOW. 
Q. AND OURSELF? 
A. „v : «•"" WERE VERY VERi 'ir?*. 
Q. W T FAR? 
A. THEY WERE STANDING RIGHT NEXT ~ •""" r,*t> 
Q. i infti TIME? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND • •:: : 7IDUALS 
HAVE ANYTHING THAT COVERED THEIR FACl NY HATS, 
GLASSES, MASK!.! , 
A. ONE OF THK INDIVIDUALS WAS WEARING SUN 
1ITHER ONE HAVE '. HA- ~" \m * T T? 
G L A S S E S . 
1 A D 
Q. 
7\ 
^ • 
COVER, 
A. 
O . 
•:Y OTHER KIND OF MASK 
YOUR DOOR? 
A. 
rHOSE TWO PEOPLE STOOD 
IU ME-- MY WINDOW WAS 
ABOUT FOUR OR FIVE INCHES DOWN, AND, YOU KNOW, UK 
«JD ()!•' i,h:ANKI> IIVKK TO SPEAK THROUGH THE OPEN PART 
THE WINDOW, AND SAID, "DO YOU KNOW WHERE P 
. . . Li. 
AGAIN SPORTS IS?" 
Q. AND WHICH OF THE TWO, THE ONE WITH SUNGLASS 
OR THE ONE WITHOUT, WAS THE ONE THAT SPOKE TO YOU? 
A. IT WAS THE DARK-HAIRED DEFENDANT, THE ONE 
WITH THE SUNGLASSES. 
Q. ALL RIGHT. AND AFTER HE ASKED YOU THAT, 
WHAT DID YOU SAY OR DO? 
A. I SAID I DID NOT KNOW WHERE THAT PLACE WAS, 
THAT I DIDN'T THINK IT WAS IN THAT AREA. 
Q. THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. AND MAYBE I SHOULD SAY, TOO, WE WERE 
TALKING ABOUT THE SUNGLASSES AT THAT POINT. I DON'T 
KNOW IF WHEN HE WAS RIGHT AT MY WINDOW THAT HE HAD 
THE SUNGLASSES ON, BUT HE WAS WEARING THEM DURING 
THE INCIDENT. 
Q. SO HE MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE HAD THEM ON--
A. AT THAT PARTICULAR MOMENT, YES. 
Q. OKAY. SO AFTER YOU TALKED ABOUT PLAY IT 
AGAIN SPORTS, THEN WHAT HAPPENED? 
A. AT THAT POINT AFTER I SAID I DIDN'T KNOW 
WHERE IT WAS, HE LIFTED A SHIRT THAT HE HAD -- I 
THOUGHT IT WAS A SHIRT-- SOME SORT OF MATERIAL THAT 
HE HAD DRAPED OVER HIS ARM, AND SHOWED ME A GUN AND 
SAID, "WELL, YOU'RE GOING TO TAKE US THERE ANYWAY." 
Q. AS SOON AS THAT PERSON SAID THAT, THE ONE 
WITH THE DARK GLASSES, DID THE TWO PEOPLE ~ m mTTT? 
S I D E O F Y O U R IHJU'M M ". I, ? •• ,. .  
A. I "THIL. THERE WER- " MOMENTS THEY 
STAYED THERE. ONE AGAIN, 
IMMEDIATELY STARTED SAYING, "UNLOCK YOUR DOOR. 
UNLOCK YOUR DOO 
Q. AND ~~ UNLOCK T DOOR? 
A. YES . * * :L>. 
Q. AND WHAT DID THE TWO PEOPLE 
a DEFENDANT WENT 
iu ini, PASSENGER SIDE ,l OPENED THE DOOR. 
AND DIDN'T POKED HIS 
HAND IN AND STARTED RUMMAGING THROUGH THE THINGS 
T H A T T IT,. | in «|«n |,; \? ^  tj,|'[' i! h! A T '" h I'll K ' ! A R . • 
w. -HAT DID THE ONE WITH T'HK DARK GLASSES DO? 
* H E 1 J I IKMA I I1KI ' " , '.'"Ill !L""H !'I I IP 1 '<' ;'"'Ki: ,!!'T !1 1 D E W I N D O W 
W I T H A G U N H K L . D T O 1 I E . 
^ I I ' '"V, I 11'" I! I Il II H K S'T'A, \ Hi" H K »«? K ? . •.
 ; 
IT WAS MINUTES, BEFORE HE TOLD KF T^ GET 
^ I-1 ' IN xnE D h ^ SEAT. 
AS YOU GOT OUT OF THE CAR D TD vrkTT ^F 
YES. 
' WITH THE DARK GLASSES 
STILL THERE Hr DRIVE! DOOR? 
1 
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A. YES. 
Q. WERE YOU ABLE TO STAND UP NEXT TO THAT 
PERSON WITH DARK GLASSES? 
A. YES. 
Q. WERE YOU ABLE TO COMPARE YOUR HEIGHT WITH 
HIS HEIGHT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND WERE YOU ABLE TO LOOK AT HIS FEATURES 
FURTHER AS YOU STOOD UP? 
A. YES . 
Q. AFTER YOU STOOD UP, DID THAT PERSON HAVE 
YOU GO SOMEWHERE IN THE CAR OR AROUND THE CAR? 
A. NOT AROUND THE CAR I JUST STEPPED OUT OF 
THE VEHICLE, AND HE ASKED ME FOR THE KEY TO THE CAR 
I GAVE HIM THE KEY, AND THEN HE TOLD ME TO GET IN 
THE BACK SEAT. 
Q. OKAY, SO THIS PERSON WITH THE DARK GLASSES 
TOLD YOU TO GET IN THE BACK SEAT? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHERE DID THE PERSON WITH DARK GLASSES GO? 
A. AT SOME POINT HE HANDED THE KEYS OFF, I 
BELIEVE, TO THE OTHER PERSON. AND THE OTHER PERSON 
GOT IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT. AND THEN I ENTERED THE 
BACK SEAT THROUGH THE REAR DOOR ON THE DRIVER'S SIDE 
AND SLID OVER, THE DARK-HAIRED DEFENDANT WITH THE 
X O 
i r 
X / 
18 
19 
20 
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25 
JUN GOI INTO TUK CKK BESIDE ME. 
SO •.: IK MACK 1- E A'l' WITH YOU? 
YES . 
AND T AROUND IN 
THAT OAR FOR SOME TIME? 
YES. 
w. ABOUT HOW LONG WERE YOU DRIVEN AROUND IN 
THAT CAR? 
A. i v 
ENTIRE EVENT 
Q. 
THAT YOU 
THAT CAK 
A. 
Q. 
THE DARK 
A. 
r> 
ii 0 'I,h 
a . 
APART. 
0. 
GLASSES 
A. 
* w 
MEAN 
p 
WERE ASKI 
• 
AND 
KEEP 
YEi; 
THE GLASSES ( 
THE 
: n TI 
WHOLE THE 
i i l l 
DURING THAT 
i 
THE DARK 
• 
ON. 
' ' 
" r i M i ' i 1 
DURATION 
II 
TIME WAS 
SEAT? 
GLASSES 
• 
"
: 
_ 
iw i.nnn 
OF THE 
" "T*^ PLACE 
W I1' V K I u u xii 
THIS PERSON WITH 
l O u t 
u SAT, 
x. rxvr. INCHES 
PERSON WITH THE 
T mHE 
xOLE HE 
TIME? 
DID HAVE 
Q. 
EYES? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
— — — — -•- i 
COULD YOU SEE, NEVERTHELESS, AT TIMES HIS 
YES, I COULD. 
HOW COULD YOU DO THAT? 
IF YOU'RE LOOKING AT SOMEONE FROM THE SIDE, 
IT'S EASY TO SEE UNDERNEATH THE GLASSES. AND I 
COULD 
THERE 
SEE HIS EYES, HIS EYELASHES, AND EYEBROWS. 
WAS-- HIS FACE WAS VISIBLE TO ME THROUGH THE 
GLASSES FROM THAT ANGLE. 
Q. 
EYES? 
A. 
MAYBE 
DID YOU NOTICE ANYTHING UNUSUAL ABOUT HIS 
YES. I THOUGHT EITHER HE WAS TIRED OR 
-- I DIDN'T KNOW IF HE WAS-- HAD BEEN 
[ DRINKING, OR WHATEVER. FOR WHATEVER REASON HE JUST 
HAD A 
WAY OF 
STOOD 
Q. 
VERY -- WHAT SEEMED TO ME TO BE KIND OF A SLOW 
BLINKING, AND THAT WAS ONE THING THAT JUST 
OUT, THAT I REMEMBERED. 
AND DURING THIS HOUR DID YOU ALSO HAVE 
CONVERSATIONS WITH THIS PERSON IN THE DARK GLASSES? 
A . 
Q. 
WHERE 
A . 
Q. 
A. 
YES . 
NOW, DID THEY EVENTUALLY TAKE YOU SOMEWHERE 
YOU WERE ASKED TO GET OUT OF THE CAR? 
YES . 
WHERE WAS THAT? 
ABOUT FIVE MILES UP BIG COTTONWOOD CANYON. 
Q. AND WHEN YOU WERE ASKED TO GET ~HT ^ THE 
CAP • •«• iJARK GLASSES DO? 
HE FOLLOWED tND WE STARTED DOWN THE 
< ? . , , , ' -nE SIDE OF WHERE 
*ii£ WAS PARKED. 
Mil Nil Vi ! RAVINE, HOW FAR 
.*..i THIS PERSON AWAY FROM YOU WITH DARK GLASSES? 
J U I x KNEW HE WAS 
COMING BEHIND HEARD HIM FOLLOWING ME. 
Q. WENT DOWN ±v ***« 
BOTTOM OF THE RAVINE? 
A. BOTTOM, BUT IT 
WAS ' '• SURE, TEN TWENTY FEET, MAYBE, 
.• KEEP GOING," 
UNTIL HE SAID STOP. AND THE I *• R O C K T H E R E , 
,",lUi III' > I null I'IKSJIJI' III I Mill i IK I E A N I N G UP A G A I N S T 
ANOTHER ROCK. • THAT WAS BASICALLY WHERE WE 
i:i I A t l'.',D . 
Q. WHERE " T"- OTHER GUY GO? 
A. THE CAR, AND DROVE OFF AT 
SOME POINT. 
Q. OTHER PERSON DROVE OFF, DID THE GUY 
WITH THE JAK- GLASSES STAY WITH YOU THERi. 
" V I 11 '• ' -
A. YES, HE ~7T 
Q. DID YOU HAVE A CHANCE TO TALK FURTHER 
THE PERSON IN THE DARK GLASSES? 
A. 
Q. 
YES, WE DID. 
DID YOU HAVE A CHANCE TO OBSERVE 
FEATURES? 
" A. 
Q. 
CANYON? 
A. 
WE WERE 
YES. 
HIS 
AND WHAT WAS THE LIGHTING LIKE UP IN 
AGAIN, IT WAS-- YOU KNOW, IT WAS 
IN THE SHADE, HOWEVER. BUT THERE 
KNOW, PATCHES OF SHADE ALL OVER, WITH ALL 
-J- -^ 
WITH 
THE 
DAYLIGHT. 
WAS, 
THE 
BUT THERE WAS AMPLE SUNLIGHT, AS WELL IN OTHER 
j OF THAT 
Q • 
RAVINE. 
YOU 
TREES. 
PARTS 
ABOUT HOW FAR AWAY FROM YOU WAS HE MOST OF ' 
THE TIME? 
A. WE WERE VERY CLOSE. I WOULD SAY 
MAYBE WERE SIX FEET APART. 
| Q. HOW LONG DID YOU STAY UP IN THAT 
WITH THAT PERSON IN THE DARK GLASSES? 
A. 
SO I'M 
Q. 
AGAIN, I WAS NOT WEARING A WATCH 
ESTIMATING, BUT AT LEAST AN HOUR. 
NOW, I'M GOING TO SKIP AHEAD IN ' 
CHRONOLOGY. AFTER THESE EVENTS OCCURRED, 
A TIME 
OUR FACES 
RAVINE 
THAT 
THE 
WAS 
THAT YOU MET WITH THE POLICE OFFICERS 
INVESTIGATING THIS CASE AND WERE ASKED TO LOOK 
DAY, 
THERE 
AT 
SOME PHOTOGRAPHS? 
A . . 
Q. AND HOW LONG AFTER MARCH THE 19TH, AFT Kb' 
T H I , ; ; K V K U T , WHIM: vmi M ' K E D '\'^J L O O K A T T H E S E 
PHOTOGRAPHS? 
A. WAS MONDAY, MARCH 2 9TH 
Q. AND WHERE WERE WHEN YOU LOOKED AT THE, 
A. DOWNTOWN " DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN'S 
Q. r WERE xvo *.±m, 
SUFFERING FROM ANYTHING xnE TIME YOU LOOKED AT 
O. HAVE YOUR GLASSES ON; 
Q. AND DID YOU HAVE ANY DRUGS OR ALCOHOL OK 
OTHER THINGS THAT WE HAVE TALKED ABOUT DURING THE 
PHOTOGRAPHS? 
GOTTEN THE CALL WHEN T 
i ACTUALLY LEFT THE O F F I L L I 
DOWN THERE. 
Q. HAD YOU HAD SLEPT THE NIGHT BEFORE AND HAD 
SUFFICIENT SLEEP? 
A . Y F..'.' . 
AND WHAT DID DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN 
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1 — — *• J-
BEFORE HE SHOWED YOU ANY PHOTOGRAPHS? 
A. 
"WE HAVE 
YOU COME 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
PICTURES' 
A. 
WHEN I TALKED TO HIM ON THE PHONE, HE SAID, 
A COUPLE GOOD SUSPECTS IN YOUR CASE. COULD 
DOWN AND LOOK AT SOME PICTURES." 
DID HE GIVE YOU SOME PICTURES? 
YES, HE DID. 
AND HOW PHYSICALLY DID HE GIVE YOU THOSE 
? 1 
I DON'T REMEMBER WHETHER I ACTUALLY TOOK 
THEM FROM HIS HANDS, OR HE MAY HAVE PLACED THEM ON A 
TABLE. BUT IT SEEMS TO ME THEY EXPLAINED THERE'D BE 
SIX PHOTOS IN EACH SET, AND THEN I WAS FREE TO, YOU 
KNOW, TAKE ONE OFF THE TOP OF THE OTHER AND SPREAD 
THEM OUT 
Q. 
ON THE TABLE. 
THESE PHOTOGRAPHS, WAS THERE ANY WRITING ON 
THE PHOTOGRAPHS THAT YOU SAW ON ANY OF THEM? 
A. 
Q. 
MIXTURE? 
A. 
Q. 
NO. 
WERE THEY IN COLOR, BLACK AND WHITE, OR A 
COLOR. 
AND DID THEY ALL PORTRAY INDIVIDUALS OF THE 
SAME RACE AND GENERAL COLORING AS THE PERSON WITH IT 
DARK GLASSES? 
A. 
Q • 
YES, AS FAR AS I CAN RECALL. 
DID THEY ALSO PORTRAY PEOPLE OF THE SAME 
AGE AND GENERAL BUILD AS THE PERSON WITH THE DARK 
GLASSES? 
A. IT LOOKED LIKE TT TO ME ~^ COURSE I COULD 
ONLY SEE FROM T l< !•' 'M' ' COULDN'T SEE--
SEE THEIR BUILD, PER I- . BUT, YKf:!, THEY ALT, LOOKED 
RELATIVEL -
g. BETWEEN THE TIME TIME ~~ THIS EVENT OF 
MARCH THESE PHOTOGRAPHS, 
HAD YCl HEARD NEW NEWS STORIES SEEN ANY PRINTED 
MATERIALS ICURRED? 
x x 
x j 
A. 
PAPEP 
i H1N k , 
™&OF 
BEFORE- I DID HE SEE AN ARTICLE IN THE 
THERE, BUT IT WAS, 1 
COUPLE PARAGRAPHS ON THE THE BACK 
POINT x AA~ 
X 3 AWAR> V '!'HA ARTICLE 
THEY 
SOMEONE ELSE SAID TO M* 
IN THE PAPER. 
X / 
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3IMILA 
o 
O . 
Q. 
PHOTOG 
HAPPENED TO ME 
NO 
-RAPHS? 
SUSPECTS? 
.OOKED THROUGH THOSE 
RAPHS DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN GAVE YOL 
INDIVIDUAL? 
YES 
Q. AND DO YOU SEE THE INDIVIDUAL IN THE 
COURTROOM TODAY THAT YOU PICKED OUT 
PHOTOGRAPHIC 
A. 
Q. 
TODAY 
• ' A . 
YES, 
LINE UP? 
OF THAT 
I DO SEE THAT INDIVIDUAL. 
WOULD YOU PHYSICALLY POINT 
AND DESCRIBE WHAT HE'S WEARING 
YES . SITTING RIGHT HERE IN 
THE YELLOW JUMPSUIT. 
MR. PARKER: MAY THE RECORD 
IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT. 
THE 
IDENTIFIED. 
Q. (BY MR. 
^ -3 
TO THAT PERSON 
TODAY? 
FRONT OF ME IN 
SHOW HE'S 
COURT: THE DEFENDANT HAS BEEN 
PARKER) NOW I'LL ASK YOU, ALSO 
THAT HE PHOTO LINEUP, DID YOU HAVE SOME OTHER 
OPPORTUNITY TO ACTUALLY SEE VARIOUS 
ACTUAL 
BEFORE 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
IT WAS 
LINEUP 
YOU? 
YES, 
> WHERE THERE WAS BODIES 
I DID. 
DO YOU REMEMBER THAT DATE? 
IT WAS LATER, IN MAY. MAY 
• 
THE 
MORE TIME. 
THE 
TUESDAY. 
PEOPLE IN 
AFTER 
AN 
THAT STOOD 
4TH, I BELIEVE 
COURT: I BEG YOUR PARDON, SIR. 
WITNESS: I BELIEVE IT 
ONE 
WAS MAY 4TH, 
THE C0UR1 THANK YOU. 
Q. (BY MR. 
PEOPLE YOU WERE SHOWN? 
A. THERE WERE K1GHT. 
Q. INDIVIDUALS? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND DO YOU RECALL WHERE THAT OCCURRED? 
A. YES. 
Q. WHERE DCCUR? 
A. DOWNTOWN 
SECOND EAST. 
0. PRIOR 
YOU TO*JD CERTAIN THINGS ABOUT THE LINEUP? 
* (NO RESPONSE.) 
v. LET UK HELP YOU OUT. 
• • ' 7v a -Rrv ? 
v. „£K. WHETHER OR it- SUSPECTS 
OR THE DEFENDAI NEUP? 
A, • OSSIBILITY THAT 
THE SUSf. P, 
ACTUALLY. 
O . A I I 1.1 WKJ.'1'l V i l l i IWtt A I . I L K "I'D I I' A T T H I ' M ' ! K 
SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS, THESE EIGHT PEOPLE AS THEY 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
LINEUP? 
A. 
'••->-••• Q -
THAT YOU 
. A. 
Q. 
A. 
_ 6. 
WERE THEY ALSO OF THE SAME RACE? 
YES. 
THE SAME GENERAL HAIR COLORING? 
IN GENERALLY. 
THE SAME GENERAL AGE? 
YES. 
AND THE SAME GENERAL SEX? 
YES . 
WERE YOU ABLE TO PICK SOMEONE OUT OF THAT 
YES, I WAS. 
AND DO YOU SEE THAT PERSON IN COURT TODAY 
WERE ABLE TO PICK OUT OF THAT LINEUP? 
YES, I SEE THAT PERSON. 
WOULD YOU TELL THE COURT WHERE HE IS TODAY? 
YES. HE'S SITTING IN FRONT OF ME IN THE 
YELLOW JUMPSUIT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE DEFENDANT HAS 
BEEN IDENTIFIED AGAIN. 
HONOR. 
MR. PARKER: NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, YOUR 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. CROSS. 
MS. REMAL: THANK YOU. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
3 
IV Mli REMAL: 
Q. MR. LEWI 0 "'HIS WAU A VKJ'V K KM CiHT KM 1 NG 
CORRECT? 
""", MA'AM. 
Q. THERE WERE SOME TIMES DURING THE 
SVENT ITSELF THAT YOU WERE CONCERNED THAT 
«j \,\U Ml I ' 'I' ii(il N(! TO MAKE, x J. wux vi.- J. * ALIVE? 
A. ABSOLUTELY. 
Q. AMU i IIET WITH THE POLICE OFFICERS, 
FAIRLY SHORTLY AFTER THE EVENT ENDED THAT UrtMl' I'M. 
A. 
: ~ THINGS THAT THE OFFICER .-
DESCRIBE THE .. ., ~ SUSPECTS 
CORRECT? 
A. 
AND YOU TOLD THAT OFFICER AT THAT POINT 
THAT ', WKI ' ' " I'l'NlMM'I'.'.Eu D X ind WHOLE THING THAT 
YOU WEREN'T '.iUPF THAT VolJ'D BE ABLE TO IDENTIFY 
THE'! I.' TWO ni'MI I M THAT CORRECT? 
YES . 
IMIFENG THE TIME THA, -r- RIDING AROUND 
IN THE BACK SEAT OF THE VEHICLE THA : 
r- RIBED, YOU INDICATED HAD THAT THE INDIVIDUAL 
WITH THE SUNGLASSES HA^ * '!UN. 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
22. 
Q. DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE RIDING 
AROUND, HE STILL HAD THAT GUN? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND THAT GUN WAS VISIBLE TO YOU THE ENTIRE 
TIME; CORRECT? 
A. YES, IT WAS POINTED AT ME. 
Q. IN FACT, IT WAS POINTED AT YOU JUST A FEW 
INCHES AWAY? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND FOR SOME OF THE TIME YOU'D LOOK AT THE 
GUN TO SEE IF IT WAS STILL POINTED AT YOU WHILE YOU 
WERE RIDING AROUND; CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
A. AFRAID ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS GOING TO BE 
FIRED AT YOU? 
A. YES. 
Q. DURING THAT TIME THAT YOU WERE IN THE BACK 
SEAT OF THE CAR, SOMETIMES YOU WERE LOOKING STRAIGHT 
AHEAD TO TRY AND FIGURE OUT WHERE YOU WERE GOING; 
CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND SOMETIMES YOU WERE LOOKING SIDEWAYS AT 
THE MAN WHO WAS SETTING NEXT TO YOU? 
A. YES. 
Q. SOMETIMES YOU WERE LOOKING AT THE MAN WHO 
WAS 
MAN 
DRIVING THE CAR? 
A. 
Q. 
WHO 
LOOKING 
A. 
Q. 
THAT'S RIGHT. 
. ** ^  
AND MOST OF THE TIME WHEN YOU LOOKED AT THE 
WAS IN THE BACK SEAT WITH YOU, YOU WERE 
AT THE SIDE OF HIS FACE; 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AND YOU'VE ALREADY SAID 
SUNGLASSES ON THE WHOLE TIME? 
A. 
Q. 
YES, HE DID. 
CORRECT? 
HE HAD THE 
AND THE WAY YOU COULD SEE THE HIS EYES WAS 
FROM LOOKING IN THE SIDE OF THE 
THE 
IN 
THE 
EDGE? 
A. 
Q. 
YES . 
AND WHAT YOU DESCRIBED 
PARTICULAR THIS SORT OF SLOW 
A. 
Q. 
SUNGLASSES, AROUND 
ABOUT HIS EYES AND 
BLINKING? 
THAT'S THE BEST WAY I CAN DESCRIBE IT. 
AND WHEN YOU LATER LOOKED AT INDIVIDUALS IN 
LINEUP, WHEN YOU VERY FIRST LOOKED AT THE 
INDIVIDUALS, DIDN'T YOU THINK THAT MAYBE THE SUSPECT 
WASN'T 
OF 
A. 
Q. 
THE 
THERE AFTER ALL, AT FIRST? 
YES. I SURE DID. 
EVENTUALLY, ONE OF THE 
PEOPLE IN THE LINEUP WAS 
BLINKING; RIGHT? 
A. YES. 
THINGS YOU LOOKED AT 
THE WAY THEY WERE 
— 2JL 
Q. AND ONE OF THE REASONS THAT YOU DECIDED 
THAT MR. HALE WAS THE SUSPECT FOR TO YOU PICK, WAS 
THAT HE WAS BLINKING IN SORT OF A SLOW WAY? 
A. YES. 
Q. DURING THE TIME THAT YOU WERE TOGETHER WITH 
THESE INDIVIDUALS, YOU MADE IT A POINT, DID YOU NOT, 
TO NOT STARE AT EITHER ONE OF THEM? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU DID THAT BECAUSE YOU WERE TRYING TO 
STAY ALIVE AND DIDN'T WANT TO MAKE THEM ANGRY? 
A. EXACTLY. 
Q. SO WHEN YOU'D LOOK ALL THEM, PARTICULARLY 
THE INDIVIDUAL WITH THE GUN, YOU'D MORE GLANCE AT 
HIM THAN LOOK AT HIM FOR VERY LONG? 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q. NOW, YOU HAVE INDICATED THAT YOU WERE 
ULTIMATELY FORCED TO GET OUT OF THE VEHICLE UP IN 
BIG COTTONWOOD CANYON? 
A. YES. 
Q. WERE FORCED TO CLIMB DOWN THE SIDE OF THE 
ROAD? 
A. THAT'S RIGHT. 
Q. AND IT SOUNDS LIKE IT'S A FAIRLY STEEP AREA 
WHERE -- YOU'RE GOING DOWN PRETTY STEEPLY AS YOU'RE 
GOING DOWN FROM THE ROAD? 
A. YES. I HAD TO ACTUALLY PUT MY HANDS IN 
BACK OF ME TO KIND OF BRACE MYSELF SO I WOULDN'T, 
YOU KNOW, FALL. 
Q. AND AS YOU WERE CLIMBING DOWN FROM THE ROAD 
DOWN INTO THE RAVINE, OR WHATEVER YOU WANT TO CALL 
IT, I TAKE IT THAT MOST OF THE TIME YOU WERE 
CONCENTRATING ON TRYING NOT TO FALL DOWN THE HILL. 
OR THAT'S PART OF WHAT YOU'RE DOING? 
A. YES. 
Q. YOU WERE LOOKING AHEAD OF YOU SO YOU COULD 
STEP IN PLACES, SO YOU WOULDN'T TUMBLE? 
A. YES. BECAUSE IT WAS VERY ROCKY, AND THERE 
WAS SNOW UP THERE AT THAT TIME, TOO. 
Q. SO THERE WAS THE EXTRA DANGER OF SLIDING ON 
THE SNOW? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. NOW, DID I UNDERSTAND YOU TO SAY THIS 
AFTERNOON THAT WHEN YOU GOT DOWN THERE YOU WERE ABLE 
TO SEE THE FACE OF THE PERSON WHO HAD THE GUN? 
A. YES. I LOOKED AT HIM-- SEVERAL TIMES 
WHILE WE WERE DOWN THERE, YES. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER TESTIFYING ABOUT THE SAME 
EVENT AT OUR PRELIMINARY HEARING ON MAY 15? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND DO YOU RECALL TESTIFYING THAT 
AJL 
ESSENTIALLY THAT AS YOU STARTED CLIMBING DOWN THERE 
YOU DIDN 
A. 
'T LOOK AT THE PERSON WITH THE GUN? 
NOT AS WE WERE CLIMBING DOWN. I CERTAINLY 
DID AFTER WE WERE SEATED ON THE ROCKS BEHIND THE 
TREES. 
' Q-
CLOSE TO 
A. 
LEANING < 
AND YOU REMEMBER THE 
YOU THEN? 
PERSON BEING SEATED 
HE WASN'T REALLY SEATED. HE WAS JUST 
DVER. STANDING, LEANING UP AGAINST SOME 
OTHER ROCKS. 
Q. 
A. 
IS ALL. 
• Q . 
HOW FAR AWAY WERE YOU AT THAT POINT? 
AGAIN, I AM THINKING 
HOW MANY TIMES WHILE 
RAVINE AREA DID YOU LOOK OVER 
HAD GUN? 
A. 
ESTIMATE 
I DIDN'T KEEP COUNT. 
MAYBE FIVE OR SIX FEET 
YOU WERE DOWN IN THAT 
AT THE PERSON WHO HAD 
I DON'T HAVE AM 
OF HOW MANY TIMES THAT HAPPENED. AGAIN, I 
WAS DOING MY BEST TO KEEP THINGS CALM AND NOT 
IRRITATE 
FOR THE 
Q. 
HIM, AND JUST HOPING 
BEST. 
WERE YOU STILL BEING 
AT THE PERSON? 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
THINGS WOULD TURN OUT 
CAREFUL NOT TO STARE 
BECAUSE DIDN'T WANT THEM TO BECOME ANGRY? 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
DID HE STILL HAVE THE SUNGLASSES ON THAT 
WHOLE TIME THAT YOU WERE DOWN IN THE RAVINE AREA? 
A. 
DID. 
Q. 
WEARING 
A. 
Q. 
NEITHER 
IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MOST OF THE TIME HE 
DO YOU EVER SPECIFICALLY REMEMBER HIM NOT 
THE SUNGLASSES? 
NO. 
DO YOU REMEMBER -- I THINK YOU SAID THAT 
OF THE MEN WERE WEARING ANY SORT OF HAT OR 
MASK TYPE COVERING? 
A. 
Q. 
NO. 
DO YOU REMEMBER WHETHER THE PERSON WITH THE 
SUNGLASSES HAD ANY SORT OF FACIAL HAIR? 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
YES, HE DID. 
WHAT DO YOU RECALL ABOUT THAT? 
DARK GOATEE AND MUSTACHE. 
DO YOU REMEMBER WHETHER THERE WERE ANY 
SIDEBURNS OR NOT? YOU KNOW HOW HOW SOME PEOPLE ARE 
HAVE SIDEBURNS CONNECTED WITH THE BEARD? 
A. 
Q. 
I DON'T RECALL SIDEBURNS. 
YOU INDICATED THAT YOU LOOKED AT THE PHOTOS 
THAT WERE SHOWN TO YOU BY DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN? 
A. 
Q • 
THAT'S CORRECT. 
AND THAT YOU PICKED A PHOTOGRAPH OF 
MR. HALE? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND YOU TOLD DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN, DID YOU 
NOT, THAT ON SCALE OF ONE TO TEN, ONE BEING NOT SURE 
AT ALL AND TEN BEING ABSOLUTELY POSITIVELY SURE, 
THAT YOU WERE ABOUT 59 ON THAT SCALE? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND AFTER THE PHOTO -- AFTER YOU SELECTED 
MR. HALE'S PHOTOGRAPH, DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN INDICATED 
TO YOU IN SOME WAY THAT YOU PICKED THE SUSPECT THAT 
THEY HAD; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. AFTER I'D IDENTIFIED BOTH PHOTOGRAPHS, YES. 
Q. AND HE INDICATED TO YOU THAT YOU'D PICKED 
THE TWO SUSPECTS THAT THE POLICE WERE SUSPICIOUS OF? 
A. RIGHT. 
Q. AND AFTER THE LINEUP, WHEN YOU PICKED 
MR. HALE, MR. PARKER INDICATED TO YOU IN SOME WAY --
THE COURT: LET ME GET JUST ONE 
CLARIFICATION, MS. REMAL. WHAT THE WITNESS JUST 
ALLUDED TO THERE WAS A PHOTO-SPREAD VERSUS A LINEUP; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
MS. REMAL: YES. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. 
Q. (BY MS. REMAL) THEN LATER ON IN MAY WHEN YOU 
HAD THE LINEUP, YOU INDICATED THAT YOU PICKED 
MR. HALE AT BEING ONE OF THE SUSPECTS. 
A. YES. 
Q. AND AFTER THE LINEUP, YOU SPOKE BRIEFLY 
WITH MR. PARKER ABOUT THE LINEUP; CORRECT? 
A. YES. 
Q. AND MR. PARKER INDICATED TO YOU THAT YOU'D 
PICKED THE PERSON WHO'D BEEN ACCUSED OF THE CRIME; 
IS THAT CORRECT? 
A. THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q. DO YOU REMEMBER HOW IT WAS THAT WAS 
INDICATED TO YOU? 
A. YES. HE HAD LEFT THE BUILDING TO WALK BACK 
TO HIS OFFICE, AND I BELIEVE I SAID TO HIM, 
SOMETHING TO THE EFFECT OF, "HOW DID I DO?" AND HE 
SAID, "YES, THAT'S HIM." 
Q. 
INDICATED 
CAR AFTER 
A. 
JUST THE 
THE 
THE 
RED-
Q. 
JUST 
THAT 
A COUPLE MORE QUESTIONS. YOU 
INITIALLY THESE MEN APPROACHED 
WALKING BY A 
YES . 
COUPLE OF TIMES? 
WELL, IT WASN'T A COUPLE. 
ONE TIME THEY PASSED. 
IT 
AND THEN ULTIMATELY ONE MAN, THE MAN 
SUNGLASSES 
OTHER 
, STAYED 
INDIVIDUAL --
-HAIRED GUY 
AROUND TO THE 
WAS HOW 
BY YOUR DRIVER'S DOOR 
I THINK YOU SAID THE 
I IDENTIFIED HIM 
PASSENGER DOOR AND OPENED 
YOUR 
WAS 
r WITH 
WHILE 
- - WENT 
THAT UP? 
A. 
Q. 
THROUGH 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
..— — ~" 
WHILE THE RED-HAIRED GUY WAS RUMMAGING 
THE STUFF YOU HAD ON THE PASSENGER SEAT? 
YES . 
1 :
 - • . . : : : 
AND THAT INCLUDED YOUR WALLET? 
THAT WAS THE FIRST THING HE TOOK, YES. 
DID YOU LOOK AT THE RED-HAIRED GUY AT THE 
TIME WHILE HE WAS DOING THAT? 
A. 
Q. 
YES. 
SO SOME OF THE TIME WHILE THE MAN WITH THE 
SUNGLASSES WAS STANDING BESIDE THE DRIVER'S DOOR, 
YOU WERE LOOKING AT THE MAN WHO WAS PAWING THROUGH 
STUFF ON THE PASSENGER SIDE? 
1 ' A* 
TIMES, 
FURTHER 
THANKS 
TO MAKE 
I WILL 
I'M SURE I 
YES . 
MS. REMAL: 
QUESTIONS. 
THE COURT: 
MR. PARKER 
THE COURT: 
GLANCED OVER THERE A COUPLE OF 
THANK YOU. I DON'T HAVE ANY 
REDIRECT? 
: NO REDIRECT. 
SIR, YOU MAY STAND DOWN. 
FOR YOUR ASSISTANCE. WOULD EITHER SIDE LIKE 
AN ARGUMENT 
MR. PARKER 
REFER TO THE 
OR STATEMENT? 
: JUST BRIEFLY, YOUR HONOR. AND 
FACTORS THAT I HAVE LAID OUT IN 
PAGE NUMBER TWO OF MY MEMORANDA, AND THAT INCLUDES 
i F I V E FACTORS THAT THE COURT SHOULD CONSIDER 
CONSIDERING ALL THE CIRCUMSTANCES AND FACTS 
TO I D E N T I F I C A T I O N . 
THOSE ARE, ONE, THE OPPORTUNITY OF 
ml V . 
I N 
RELATED 
THE 
WITNESS TO VIEW THE ACTOR. TWO, THE W I T N E S S ' S 
DEGREE OF ATTENTION. THREE, THE W I T N E S S ' S < 
FOUR, THE W I T N E S S ' S I D E N T I F I C A T I O N S WERE 
SPONTANEOUSLY MADE OR REMAINED C O N S I S T E N T . 
CAPACITY. 
AND, 
F I V E , THE NATURE OF THE EVENT BEING OBSERVED. 
HERE, YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE A FAIRLY 
PERIOD OF TIME WITH DURING WHICH T H I S WHOLE 
LONG 
THING 
OCCURRED. THE WITNESS T E S T I F I E D TO SOME PERIOD OF 
TIME WHEN HE F I R S T STARTED SEEING THE DEFENDANT AND 
T H I S OTHER PERSON, AND AS THEY APPROACHED FROM THE 
BACK HE WAS ABLE TO SEE THEM BEFORE REALLY 
THE TRAUMA OF THE EVENTS S T A R T S . SO HE WAS 
SEE THEM AS THEY PASSED THE CAR. AND WHEN 
BEFORE 
ABLE TO 
THEY 
TURNED BACK AND CAME BACK, HE SAW THEIR F A C E S . 
THEN HE SAW THEM I N I T I A L L Y AT THE DOOR AND 
ACTUALLY SPOKE WITH THE PERSON WITH THE DARK 
G L A S S E S , WHO HE HAS I D E N T I F I E D AS THE DEFENDANT, 
PRIOR TO THE PRODUCTION OF THE GUN. ALL DURING 
WHICH THERE WAS NO TRAUMA OF T H I S EVENT AND 
THE FRIGHTENING CIRCUMSTANCES THAT OCCURRED 
THESE I N D I V I D U A L S WERE VERY CLOSE. 
NONE OF 
LATER. 
THE 
WITNESS HAD SLEPT THE NIGHT BEFORE, HE HADN'T TAKEN 
DRUGS, AT LEAST ANY IMPROPER SUBSTANCES. NO 
ALCOHOL. THE PRESCRIPTION DRUGS THAT HE TOOK HELPED 
TO CLEAR HIS MIND AND HELPED HIM IN DOING WHAT HE 
NEEDED TO DO. THEY DID NOT INTERFERE WITH HIS 
CAPACITY. 
BUT BEYOND THAT, AFTER THE EVENT OCCURRED, 
WHEN HIS ATTENTION WAS FOCUSED VERY MUCH ON THE 
EVENT AND ON THE ACTORS, AND THERE'S NO ROOM FOR 
ARGUMENT HERE THAT SOMEHOW THE VICTIM DID NOT 
UNDERSTAND THE NATURE OF THIS EVENT, DID NOT 
UNDERSTAND HE WAS BEING ROBBED, OR THIS DEFENDANT 
AND THIS OTHER PERSON WERE ROBBING HIM. 
HE STOOD RIGHT NEXT TO THE DEFENDANT. AND 
AS HE WAS ASKED TO GET OUT OF THE CAR, HE WAS THEN 
PLACED BACK INTO THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR WITH THE 
DEFENDANT AND SPENT AN HOUR OR SO RIDING AROUND, 
TALKING WITH THE TWO PEOPLE IN THE CAR, AND 
INCLUDING THE DEFENDANT. 
THE ONLY MASK OF THE DEFENDANT'S FACE WAS 
THESE DARK GLASSES, OF WHICH HE COULD SEE INTO HIS 
EYES FROM THE SIDE VIEW. HE WAS THEN TAKEN UP THE 
CANYON AND, AGAIN, SPENT A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF 
TIME WITH THE DEFENDANT, AS THE OTHER PERSON TOOK 
THE CAR AND LEFT. 
THIS IS PLENTY OF OPPORTUNITY FOR THE 
WITNESS TO VIEW THE ACTOR. HIS DEGREE OF ATTENTION, 
I THINK, IS FOUND FROM THE EVENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES 
THAT HE IS ABLE TO DESCRIBE THINGS IN DETAIL. HE'S 
A CREDIBLE WITNESS. 
HIS CAPACITY ALSO IS INDICATED BY THE 
NATURE OF THAT. HE SPEAKS ABOUT THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
AND HE CAN TALK ABOUT THAT IN A LOGICAL MANNER, THE 
ORDER IN WHICH THINGS PROCEEDED. 
HE HAS IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT TWICE 
BEFORE, IN BOTH A PHOTO SHOW-UP AND IN A PHYSICAL 
LINEUP. HE HAS NEVER BEEN WRONG IN HIS 
IDENTIFICATION. HE INDICATES THAT HE HAS NOT SEEN, 
NOR AT LEAST PRIOR TO THE PHOTO LINEUP ANY 
PHOTOGRAPHS OR ANY OTHER PICTURES THAT WOULD POINT 
HIM AT THE DEFENDANT. I DO NOT - - I DO NOT THINK 
THERE'S ANY INDICATION IN EITHER LINEUP OF ANY 
IMPROPER SUGGESTION IN THE MANNER THEY WERE 
CONDUCTED OR THE MANNER OF THE PERSONS OR 
PHOTOGRAPHS WERE SHOWN TO HIM. 
AND, AGAIN, JUST BY THE VERY NATURE OF THIS 
EVENT, THE NATURE OF -- AS HE TALKS, HOW HE TRIED TO 
KEEP THINGS CALM, AND HE TRIED TO DO SOME THINGS TO 
MAKE SURE HE SURVIVED, INDICATED THAT HE APPROACHED 
THIS VERY LOGICALLY, AND TRIED TO DO THE BEST HE 
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CAN, BUT WAS IN A SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES THAT CAN ONLY 
CORROBORATE AND INDICATE THE RELIABILITY OF HIS 
IDENTIFICATION. 
THE SHEER LENGTH OF TIME AND THE PROXIMITY 
THAT HE HAD DURING THIS LONG TIME WITH THE DEFENDANT 
AND THIS OTHER INDIVIDUAL INDICATES THAT HIS 
IDENTIFICATIONS, BOTH OUT OF COURT AND IN COURT, ARE 
RELIABLE. 
MS. REMAL: BRIEFLY YOUR HONOR. IN TERMS 
OF THE OPPORTUNITY OF THE WITNESS TO VIEW THE ACTOR, 
AS MR. PARKER ALSO INDICATED, THE SUNGLASSES OF 
COURSE WOULD IMPEDE THAT TO SOME EXTENT. HIS 
ABILITY TO SEE THE INDIVIDUAL WAS OF COURSE ALSO 
AFFECTED BY THE STABILITY, BY THE FACT THAT HE'S 
SOMETIMES LOOKING AT THE GUN, SOMETIMES HE IS 
LOOKING AT THE OTHER PARTICIPANT, AND SOMETIMES HE'S 
j LOOKING AHEAD. 
AND MOSTLY HE'S LOOKING AT THE SIDE OF THAT 
INDIVIDUAL'S FACE. ALTHOUGH CERTAINLY I REALIZE 
THAT AS THE VICTIM OF THIS CRIME HE UNDERSTANDS THAT 
IS AN UNUSUAL EVENT, PRIOR TO THAT, WHEN THE 
INDIVIDUALS APPROACHED THE CAR AND ASKED ABOUT THE 
LOCATION OF SOME OTHER BUSINESS, HE'S NOT REALLY 
NECESSARILY UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS IS GOING TO LEAD 
TO SOMETHING ELSE. SO MAY NOT HAVE BEEN PAYING AS 
MUCH ATTENTION AS THAT POINT, CLEARLY, AS HE MIGHT 
OTHERWISE HAD DONE. 
CERTAINLY AN INDIVIDUAL IN MR. LEWIS'S 
SITUATION WOULD BE, LIKE HIM, VERY TRAUMATIZED. AND 
IN FACT HE INDICATED TO THE OFFICERS WHEN HE MET 
WITH THEM RIGHT AFTER THE EVENT HAD ENDED, THAT HE 
WAS SO TRAUMATIZED HE WASN'T SURE THAT HE COULD 
IDENTIFY THESE INDIVIDUALS. AND THAT'S CERTAINLY 
UNDERSTANDABLE. 
IN TERMS OF ANY SUGGESTIVE FACTORS, I'D 
SUBMIT TO THE COURT THERE ARE SOME SIGNIFICANT 
SUGGESTIVE FACTORS THAT I THINK THE COURT OUGHT TO 
CONSIDER. AND THAT IS, THAT AFTER THE PHOTO-SPREAD 
MR. LEWIS WAS TOLD BY THE DETECTIVE THAT HE GOT THE 
RIGHT GUY. 
SORT 
THAT 
OF A 
DID 
MR. LEWIS 
I WOULD 
PAI 
YOU 
' ON 
THE 
SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT 
THE BACK BY AN AUTHORITY 
RIGHT 
INDICATED HE 
THING. SO TO THE -
WASN'T ABSOLUTELY 
THAT'S 
FIGURE 
EXTENT THAT 
SURE IN HIS 
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PHOTO- SPREAD, SOMEBODY -- SORT 
OF AN AUTHORITY FIGURE 
SURE THIS 
INDICATED 
"YOU GOT 
IS 
AND, 
TO 
HIM, 
THE RIGHT 
HAS INDICATED, "YOU CAN BE 
GUY. " 
AGAIN, AFTER THE LINEUP, MR 
HIM THAT HE PICKED THE RIGHT 
" HOWEVER 
. PARKER 
GUY, OR 
IT WAS THAT HE INDICATED 
THAT . 
I'D SUBMIT TO THE COURT THAT THAT IN FACT 
IS SOME SUGGESTION THAT IS IMPROPER, AND THAT THAT 
CERTAINLY AFFECTS THE WITNESS'S ABILITY TO HAVE AND 
I INDEPENDENT RECOLLECTION OF THE EVENT, THE 
IDENTIFICATION. AND I SUBMIT THAT UNDER THOSE 
CIRCUMSTANCES THE COURT OUGHT TO DISALLOW THE STATE 
FROM HAVING MR. LEWIS TESTIFY TO ANYTHING OTHER THAN 
i HIS INITIAL IDENTIFICATION IN THE PHOTO- SPREAD. 
BECAUSE I WOULD SUBMIT THAT THE LINEUP AND 
THE IN-COURT IDENTIFICATION, ALL OF WHICH TOOK PLACE 
AFTER DETECTIVE TIMMERMAN'S STATEMENT THAT, "YOU 
PICKED THE RIGHT SUSPECTS IN THE OF PHOTO- SPREAD, " 
WOULD HAVE TAINTED THOSE LATER IDENTIFICATIONS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. IT IS CLEAR FROM 
i THE CASE LAW, AND I AM REFERRING NOT ONLY TO 
RAMIREZ, BUT ALSO TO STATE VERSUS NELSON, THE 
EARLIER CASE OF STATE VS LONG, AS TO THE COURT'S 
1 CONSIDERATION OF THE RELIABILITY OF EYE-WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION, THERE ARE A NUMBER OF FACTORS FOR 
THE COURT TO CONSIDER BEFORE EYE-WITNESS 
IDENTIFICATION DATA IS PRESENTED TO THE FINDER OF 
FACT . 
WE HAVE AN UNUNUSUALLY CLEAR, ARTICULATE 
WITNESS IN THIS CASE. THAT IS NOT ALWAYS WHAT 
PROSECUTION HAS TO DEAL WITH, OR WHAT THE DEFENSE 
HAS TO CONTEND WITH. 
THE INDIVIDUAL IN THIS CASE IS A MAN WHO 
APPEARS TO BE, AND I DON'T KNOW IF I AM CORRECT ON 
HIS AGE, BUT IN HIS LATER '30S, OR '40S. HE'S NOT 
TOO YOUNG, HE'S NOT TOO OLD, TO HAVE GOOD JUDGMENT 
AND A SENSE OF PERSPECTIVE. HE HAS ATTESTED TO THE 
FACT THAT HE HAD MORE THAN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO 
SEE, TO REMEMBER, TO FORM AN OPINION, TO LOOK AT THE 
PERSON HE IDENTIFIED AS THE DEFENDANT, FROM A NUMBER 
OF DIFFERENT ANGLES, OVER A LENGTHY PERIOD. 
THAT THERE WAS NOTHING OBSCURING HIS FACE 
IN GENERAL, THAT HIS EYES WERE COVERED BY 
SUNGLASSES, BUT THAT HE WAS ABLE TO SEE BEHIND THE 
EYES. IN FACT, ONE OF THE THINGS HE NOTICED WAS THE 
PATTERN, IF YOU WILL, OF BLINKING. HIS 
IDENTIFICATION IS CONSISTENT WITH HIS DESCRIPTION. 
THE IDENTIFICATION IS CONSISTENT IN EVERY RESPECT. 
THERE 
ALSO 
NEVER 
THAT 
WAS AN IDENTIFICATION IN A 
A LINEUP, 
PHOTO-
AND THEY WERE CONSISTENT 
BEEN A FAILURE IDENTIFY. 
THERE 
MAY IMPACT 
IDENTIFICATION 
THE CASE. IT'S 
IS A THEORY THAT ONE OF 
ONE'S ABILITY TO MAKE A 
IS FEAR. AND CERTAINLY 
ALSO THE COURT'S BELIEF 
SPREAD, 
THERE 
AND 
' S 
THE FACTORS 
GOOD 
THAT MAY BE 
THAT FEAR 
MAY BE A FACTOR THAT ENHANCES ONE'S OPPORTUNITY TO 
LOOK CLOSELY, TO OBSERVE, AND TO REMEMBER, BECAUSE 
YOU KNOW IT'S IMPORTANT TO DO SO. 
IN THIS CASE I FIND THAT, AS MS. REMAL-- OR 
I BELIEVE MR. PARKER POINTED OUT, SOME OF THE 
OBSERVATIONS PRECEDED WHAT ONE WOULD REFER TO AS 
TRAUMA. THEY OCCURRED THROUGH FIRST THE REAR VIEW 
MIRROR, AND AS THE PERSONS STEPPED NEARER THE CAR 
ITSELF, LONG BEFORE A WEAPON WAS DISPLAYED. 
AND ONCE THE WEAPON WAS DISPLAYED, THE 
WITNESS HAD EVERY REASON TO BE CAUTIOUS AND CAREFULM 
WHICH HE WAS, SHOWING A CALM, LOGICAL, INTELLIGENT 
APPROACH. BUT HE ALSO HAD EVERY REASON TO REMEMBER 
THE FACES OF THE INDIVIDUALS. AND THAT'S CONSISTENT 
WITH HIS IDENTIFICATION. 
HE NOT ONLY SAW THE PERSON FROM A DISTANCE, 
HE SAW THE PERSON CLOSE UP. HE NOT ONLY SAW THE 
PERSON FROM THE POSITION OF BEING IN THE CAR LOOKING 
OUTSIDE OF THE CAR, HE ALSO HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO 
ASSESS HEIGHT AND STATURE BY STANDING NEXT TO THE 
INDIVIDUALS. 
THERE ARE NO RACE ISSUES THAT CONFUSE OR 
MAKE MORE DIFFICULT THE ISSUE OF IDENTIFICATION. 
THERE ARE NO PROBLEMS WITH THE WITNESS'S CAPACITY TO 
MAKE OBSERVATIONS, NO PROBLEMS WITH HIS MENTAL STATE 
ON THE DATE AT ISSUE. HE APPEARS TO BE A SUPREMELY 
INTELLIGENT MAN, WHO HAD AN ADEQUATE AMOUNT OF TIME 
TO SLEEP, WHO WAS NOT UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF DRUGS 
THAT WOULD HAVE INTERFERRED WITH HIS CAPACITY TO 
OBSERVE, TO REMEMBER. 
HE ALSO TESTIFIED IN A MANNER CONSISTENT 
WITH SOMEONE WHO PAID CAREFUL ATTENTION AND WAS 
FOCUSED ON WHAT WAS OCURRING. THE COURT ALSO NOTES 
THAT WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT WHAT I WOULD CALL A 
SUGGESTIVE IDENTIFICATION PROCESS. THAT IS, AT THE 
SHOW-UP PROCESS. BUT RATHER THE MORE STANDARD AND 
PERMISSIBLE PROCESS OF FIRST COMMENCING WITH THE 
DESCRIPTION, FOLLOWED BY A PHOTO- SPREAD. 
AND IN THIS CASE THE COURT NOTES THE 
PHOTO-SPREAD IS IS SIX SIMILARLY COLORED 
PHOTOGRAPHS, WHICH I THINK IS MORE LIKELY TO YIELD A 
FAIR DETERMINATION AS TO IDENTIFICATION. 
THAT IS FOLLOWED BY A LINEUP INVOLVING 
EIGHT SIMILAR INDIVIDUALS, WITH SIMILAR COLORING, 
STATURE, SIMILAR RACE, ETC. THE WITNESS HAS FURTHER 
ATTESTED TO GOOD LIGHTING THROUGHOUT WHAT WAS A LONG 
ENCOUNTER. 
WE'RE NOT TALKING ABOUT LESS THAN A MINUTE, 
ONE PERSON LOOKING AT ANOTHER OVER THE COUNTER IN A 
CONVENIENCE STORE. RATHER, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT A 
SCENARIO THAT INCLUDES A VARIETY OP OPPORTUNITIES TO 
OBSERVE OVER A FAIRLY SIGNIFICANT PERIOD OF TIME. 
THERE'S BEEN NOTHING IN THE WITNESS'S 
DEMEANOR TO SUGGEST THAT ANY FEAR HE MIGHT HAVE FELT 
HAS RESULTED IN CONFUSION. AS MR. PARKER HAS 
POINTED OUT, THE WITNESS'S SPEECH WAS CALM, PRECISE, 
LOGICAL, THOUGHTFUL, AND CLEAR, IN HIS DESCRIPTIONS 
OF WHAT HE HE OBSERVED AND IN HIS RECOLLECTION, AND 
SO FORTH, OF THE SAME. 
THEREFORE, THE COURT FINDS THAT THE WITNESS 
HAD AN ADEQUATE OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW THE ACTOR DURING 
THE EVENT AND LEADING UP TO THE EVENT, THAT THE 
WITNESS PAID A HIGH DEGREE OF ATTENTION TO THE ACTOR 
AT THE TIME OF THE EVENT BECAUSE OF THE NATURE OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES, BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT HE IS A 
RELATIVELY YOUNG MAN WITH GOOD JUDGMENT AND GREAT 
CAPACITY TO OBSERVE AND REMEMBER. 
THAT HE DOES IN FACT TESTIFY TO HIS 
CAPACITY TO OBSERVE THE EVENTS, AND HIS STATEMENTS, 
AS WELL, REFLECTED THAT, THAT HE HAD NO PHYSICAL OR 
MENTAL LIMITATION. ON THE CONTRARY, HE HAD PHYSICAL 
AND MENTAL ACCUITY. 
THAT THE IDENTIFICATION WAS MADE IN A 
RESPONSIBLE MANNER THAT IT BEGAN WITH HIS 
DESCRIPTION, UNAIDED BY SOMEONE ATTEMPTING TO DIRECT 
THAT DESCRIPTION IN ANY PARTICULAR MANNER OR 
ATTEMPTING TO SUGGEST A CERTAIN DESCRIPTION WOULD BE 
APPROPRIATE OR CONSISTENT. 
THE MERE FACT THAT OFFICER TIMMERMAN MAY 
HAVE SAID TO HIM, AFTER HIS IDENTIFICATION, AND 
AFTER HIS DESCRIPTION, THAT HE HAD PICKED A PERSON 
THAT THEY ALSO BELIEVED MIGHT BE THE INDIVIDUAL, TO 
THIS COURT'S MIND DID NOT IN ANY WAY TAINT THAT 
IDENTIFICATION. 
IT WAS NOT PRIOR TO; IT WAS SUBSEQUENT TO 
THE IDENTIFICATION. IT IS CLEAR WHEN THE WITNESS 
WAS BROUGHT IN FOR THE IDENTIFICATION PROCEDURE IT 
WAS IS NOT SO FAR AFTER THE THE EVENT THAT HIS 
MEMORY WOULD HAVE BEEN IMPAIRED. RATHER, IT WAS 
CLOSE IN TIME, AS WAS THE LINEUP. AND THERE WAS NO 
IMPERMISSIBLE SUGGESTION PRIOR TO THE PHOTO-SPREAD 
OR THE LINEUP SUCH AS, " 
SPREAD; PICK 
LINEUP; PICK 
THEM 
THEM 
RATHER, 
LIKE YOU TO LOOK 
OUT, " 
OUT . " 
IT WAS 
AT THIS 
THE PERSON'S IN 
OR, "THE PERSON' 
THE 
S IN 
A GENERAL STATEMENT, 
AND SEE 
THE PERSON OR PERSONS THAT WERE 
NOT IMPERMISSIBLE 
TESTIMONY OF 
INDICATES TO 
THE 
THE 
AND, 
WITNESS 
FURTHER 
, TAKEN 
COURT THAT THE 
IF YOU 
INVOLVED 
, ALL OF 
IN IT'S 
CAN 
. " 
THE 
THE 
THE 
"WE ' D 
IDENTIFY 
THIS 
TOTALITY, 
IS 
EVENT WAS OBSERVED 
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j CLEARLY AND CAREFULLY BY THE WITNESS, THAT THERE IS 
A STRONG LIKELIHOOD, CONSISTENT WITH HIS TESTIMONY, 
THAT HE WAS ABLE TO PERCEIVE, REMEMBER, AND RELATE 
WHAT WAS OBSERVED. 
THE FACTORS THAT IMPACT OBSERVATION, 
INCLUDING LIGHTING, TIME OF OBSERVATION, LENGTH OF 
OBSERVATION, ANY BIASES, INTERFERRENCE, HAVE ALL 
BEEN CONSIDERED BY THIS COURT, AND THE COURT FINDS 
NO BIAS, NO INTERFERENCE WITH THE OPPORTUNITY TO SEE 
OR THE CAPACITY TO REMEMBER. 
THERE ARE NO RACIAL COMPONENTS HERE. AND 
IN SHORT, THE COURT FINDS THAT WHILE THIS IS AN 
ISSUE OF FACT, NELSON AND RAMIRIZ MADE CLEAR THAT 
THE COURT MUST MAKE AN INITIAL INDICATION OF WHETHER 
THE EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION IS RELIABLE. AND 
THIS COURT DETERMINES AT THIS TIME THAT IT IS A 
RELIABLE EYE-WITNESS IDENTIFICATION. 
BASED UPON THE FACTORS I'VE INDICATED. 
THAT IS TO SAY, THE FINDERS OF FACT WHO LISTEN TO 
THIS EVIDENCE COULD CONCLUDE THAT THE WITNESS HAS 
IDENTIFIED THE DEFENDANT, AND THERE ARE MANY FACTORS 
THAT CAN BE CONSIDERED IN THE JURY MAKING SUCH AN 
ASSESSMENT. THERE IS NOT A PAUCITY OF EVIDENCE HERE 
OR THE LACK OF OPPORTUNITY FOR IDENTIFICATION. 
TO THE CONTRARY. THE WITNESS, FURTHER, HAS 
SUFFICIENT AGE TO HAVE LIFE EXPERIENCES THAT WOULD 
AID HIM IN MAKING AN IDENTIFICATION. 
IN OTHER WORDS, HE'S NOT, IF YOU WILL 
EXCUSE ME FOR USING THE PHRASE THAT'S SO REPUGNANT I 
TO MY DAUGHTER, HE'S NOT A KID. HE'S NOT AN ELDERLY 
PERSON WITH SIGHT PROBLEMS, BUT RATHER A PERSON OF 
MODERATE TO YOUNG AGE WHO IS IN AN EXCELLENT 
POSITION TO MAKE AN IDENTIFICATION. 
AND THE COURT FURTHER INCLUDES THAT THE 
IDENTIFICATION WAS INDEPENDENT OF ANY SUGGESTIVE 
PROCEDURES, ATTITUDES, OR STATEMENTS BY LAW 
ENFORCEMENT. I WILL FURTHER CONSIDER THESE SAME 
FACTORS AS THE TESTIMONY IS ADDUCED, BUT I HAVE MADE 
THESE FINDINGS AT THIS TIME BASED UPON THE TESTIMONY 
I HEARD TODAY AND MY CAREFUL CONSIDERATION OF THE 
SAME . 
WE HAD A DESCRIPTION, FOR EXAMPLE, NOT ONLY 
RELATIVE TO HEIGHT AND LIGHTING, BUT AS TO THE 
COLORING OF THE DEFENDANT, HIS STATURE, HIS FACIAL 
HAIR, THE COLOR OF HIS HEAD HAIR, CERTAIN SPECIFIC 
CHARACTERISTICS ABOUT HIS EYES. 
AND ALL OF THIS CAUSED THE COURT TO BELIEVE 
THAT THE WITNESS IS A PERSON WHO IS CREDIBLE, AND TO 
WHOM THE JURY COULD LOOK FOR RELIABLE TESTIMONY, AND 
MAY ATTEND TO THE SAME. 

MR. PARKER: I DO NOT. 
MS. REMAL: I DON'T. 
THE COURT: WHAT I'M GOING TO DO IS WHAT I 
BELIEVE I SUGGESTED TO YOU BOTH BEFORE. I WILL ASK 
THE VOIR STOCK VOIR DIRE, WHICH INCLUDES SOME OF 
WHAT YOU HAVE ASKED FOR, OR BOTH SPECIFICALLY ASKED. 
AND THOSE QUESTIONS YOU MAY ASK YOURSELF, 
OR YOU MAY FOLLOW-UP ON ANY QUESTIONS THE COURT ASKS 
OR REMIND THE COURT, EITHER BY ASKING THEMSELVES OR 
ASKING ME TO ASK ANY QUESTIONS THAT ARE LOGICAL BY 
WAY OF FOLLOW-UP THAT I MAY NOT HAVE ASKED. 
IN OTHER WORDS, MY PURPOSE IS TO LET YOU BE 
INVOLVED IN THE VOIR DIRE PROCESS. I HAVE 
INSTRUCTIONS. YOU MAY CERTAINLY SUPPLEMENT THEM AS 
WE GO THROUGH. I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANYTHING 
FURTHER AT THIS TIME IN TERMS OF TIMING, SO WE'LL 
COMMENCE AS NINE IN TERMS OF PICKING A JURY. WE'LL 
MOVE AS QUICKLY AS WE CAN, MAKING SURE THAT WE TAKE 
THE TIME WE NEED TO. I EXPECT TO HAVE A JURY AND DO 
OPENINGS BEFORE THE NOON RECESS. WE'LL PROBABLY NOT 
HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO CALL WITNESS UNTIL THE 
AFTERNOON. 
MY HABIT IS GENERALLY TAKE AN HOUR AND A 
HALF FOR LUNCH, AND GENERALLY BREAK AROUND FIVE OR 
FIVE-THIRTY, DEPENDING ON THE PROGRESS WE'RE MAKING. 
ml A , 
1 I WON'T STOP AT NOON I F WE ARE THE MIDDLE 
2 OF SOMETHING. WE'LL GO A L I T T L E LATER. BUT 
3 GENERALLY, WE TRY TO STOP AROUND NOON. BUT I TRY TO 
4 BE S E N S I T I V E TO COUNSEL'S SUGGESTION, AND ALSO TO 
5 THE W I T N E S S ' S SCHEDULE. I F WE'RE CLOSE TO F I N I S H I N G 
6 WITH SOMEONE, I LIKE TO DO THAT BEFORE WE TAKE OUR 
7 NOON BREAK. WE WILL TAKE A SHORT BREAK I N THE 
8 MORNING AND A SHORT BREAK I N THE AFTERNOON, AS WELL. 
9 ON TUESDAY, WE'LL LIKELY START AT 8 : 3 0 
1 0 INSTEAD OF 9 : 0 0 O'CLOCK. 
1 1 MR. PARKER, HOW MANY W I T N E S S E S , TOTAL, WILL 
1 2 YOU BECALLING I N THE T R I A L ? 
1 3 MR. PARKER: WELL, MY ACTUAL WITNESS L I S T 
1 4 INCLUDES ABOUT EIGHT, BUT THE ONES THAT I ' M ASSUMING 
1 5 WE'LL GO FORWARD WITH, BARRING SOME CHANGE, I S JUST 
1 6 F I V E . TWO OF THOSE WILL BE RATHER LONG, THREE 
1 7 FAIRLY B R I E F . 
1 8 THE COURT: MS. REMAL? 
1 9 MS. REMAL: I A N T I C I P A T E TWO OR THREE. 
2 0 THE COURT: OKAY. AND I KNOW THAT YOU MAY 
2 1 NOT HAVE MADE T H I S DETERMINATION, OR MAY NOT BE 
2 2 PREPARED TO DIVULGE THE INFORMATION, WHICH YOU DON'T 
2 3 NEED TO, BUT HAVE YOU MADE A DETERMINATION AS TO 
2 4 WHETHER THE DEFENDANT WILL BE T E S T I F Y I N G ? 
2 5 MS. REMAL: I HAVE NOT. WE HAVE D I S C U S S E D 
IN TOGETHER. AND, FRANKLY, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE 
INDICATED TO HIM THAT I THINK WE OUGHT TO MAKE THAT 
DECISION FINALLY ONCE THE STATE HAS COMPLETED THEIR 
CASE. 
THE COURT: CERTAINLY THAT'S UP TO YOU. I 
JUST THOUGHT IF YOU HAD A PERCEPTION AT THIS POINT, 
IT MIGHT BE HELPFUL. WE SHALL OBVIOUSLY LET YOU 
RESERVE THE RIGHT TO MAKE THAT DETERMINATION WHEN 
YOU DEEM IT APPROPRIATE. 
WHAT I AM ASKING IS THAT, MR. PARKER, YOU 
MAKE KNOWN ANY AND ALL WITNESSES YOU MIGHT CALL. 
THE SAME WITH MS. REMAL. 
MICHELLE, HOW MANY JURORS DO WE HAVE COMING 
IN? 
THE CLERK: WE HAVE ORDERED 27. 
THE COURT: TWENTY- SEVEN. AND TO MY 
RECOLLECTION, THIS CASE RECEIVED A LITTLE BIT OF 
PUBLICITY, BUT NOT A LARGE AMOUNT. 
MS. REMAL: I THINK THAT'S ACCURATE. 
THE COURT: SO I THINK THAT'S A GOOD NUMBER 
OF JURORS. DOES ANYONE HAVE ANY CONCERN WITH THE 
NUMBER. 
MR. PARKER: NOT I. 
MS. REMAL: NO. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WANT TO PICK AN 
3 - 3 
ALTERNATE? 
MS. REMAL: I DON'T--
MR. PARKER: I DON'T THINK WE NEED IT. I 
THINK THIS WILL BE A DAY-AND-A-HALF TRIAL. 
THE COURT: SO UNLESS WE RUN INTO A PANEL 
OF JURORS THAT ALL LOOK LIKE THEY MAY HAVE 
SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS, WE WON'T PICK AN ALTERNATE. 
BUT I WILL RESERVE THE RIGHT TO KIND OF USE MY 
INSTINCTS ON THAT. AND I WILL LOOK FORWARD TO 
SEEING YOU BOTH ON MONDAY. IS THERE ANYTHING 
FURTHER? 
MS. REMAL: NOPE. 
MR. PARKER: NO. 
THE COURT: OKAY. AND ANY CLOTHES ISSUE TO 
THE DEFENDANT? 
MS. REMAL: THEY'RE ALREADY HEAR IN THE 
BUILDING 
THE COURT: GREAT. WE'LL LOOK FORWARD TO 
SEEING YOU, THEN, ON MONDAY. THANK YOU. WE'RE IN 
RECESS. 
(PROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED AT 5:15 P.M.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
STATE OF UTAH : 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE : 
I, GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CERTIFIED SHORTHAND 
REPORTER AND REGISTERED PROFESSIONAL REPORTER IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH HEREBY CERTIFY: 
THAT I AM AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER IN THE 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH; 
THAT I WAS PRESENT DURING THE ENTIRE 
PROCEEDINGS IN THE BEFORE - ENTITLED CAUSE; 
THAT THE PROCEEDINGS WERE REPORTED 
STENOGRAPHICALLY BY ME, AND WERE THEREAFTER 
TRANSCRIBED. 
THAT SAID TRANSCRIPT CONSTITUTES TO THE 
BEST OF MY ABILITY A TRUE AND COMPLETE RECORD OF THE 
PROCEEDINGS HAD. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF, I HAVE SUBSCRIBED MY 
NAME AND SEAL THIS 5TH DAY OF JANUARY, 2000. 
Cz£S!£&£££. 
GAYLE B. CAMPBELL, CSR, RPR 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
JACOB ROSS HALE, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW AND ORDER 
Case No. 991906795 
Hon. Leslie Lewis 
This matter came before this court for a hearing on the reliability of an eyewitness 
identification on August 19, 1999. Paul B. Parker, Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney, 
represented the State. Defendant was present and represented by Lisa Remal, Salt Lake Legal 
Defender Association. Mitch Lewis, the eyewitness, testified about the events of March 19, 
1999. Ms. Remal had the opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Lewis. Both sides then argued the 
matter. 
Having heard the evidence and considered the arguments, this court makes the following 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On March 19, 1999, Mitch Lewis, a white male in his later thirties, was seated 
alone in his car parked in Sugarhouse Park reading the newspaper. It was daytime and the area 
was well lighted. Mr. Lewis could see clearly with his glasses that he was wearing at the time. 
2. Mr. Lewis looked into the rearview mirror and saw two white males walking 
toward him. He returned to reading. 
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3. Mr. Lewis looked up again as the two walked within a few feet of his car. 
4. Mr. Lewis looked up again and saw the two males walking back toward his car. 
This time Mr. Lewis saw the faces of the two. 
5. Mr. Lewis looked up the final time to see the two males standing within a few feet 
of the driver's door of his car. 
6. One of the males, later identified as defendant, spoke to Mr. Lewis about the 
location of a local business. 
7. Defendant had dark glasses on and had some facial hair but otherwise his face 
was uncovered. The other male, later identified as Justin Dongarra did not have his face covered 
either. 
8. As Mr. Lewis first spoke with the two males, he was not upset or frightened. He 
was rested and was not under the influence of alcohol or drugs. He had taken some prescription 
drugs. One of these was for depression and actually helped clear his mind. He was not under the 
influence of these drugs nor did they interfere with his ability to observe and remember. 
9. Defendant pulled a gun and pointed it at Mr. Lewis. Defendant then had Mr. 
Lewis get out of the car. As Mr. Lewis did, he stood within a few feet of defendant. He was 
able to see defendant as they stood and was able to compare heights and listen to his voice. 
10. Defendant directed Mr. Lewis to sit in the back seat of the car. Defendant got into 
the back seat and sat inches away from Mr. Lewis. 
11. Justin Dongarra drove the car. For more than one hour, the three drove around. 
During this time the two made direct and implied threats to Mr. Lewis. 
12. Mr. Lewis saw the side of defendant's face and could see defendant's eyes 
through the side of the dark glasses. Mr. Lewis noted that defendant blinked in slow unusual 
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manner. Mr. Lewis also saw the front of defendant's face for brief periods of time during the 
trip. 
13. Eventually, defendant and Mr. Dongarra drove Mr. Lewis up Big Cottonwood 
Canyon and stopped the car. They made Mr. Lewis get out and walk down the roadside toward 
the creek. Defendant followed. Mr. Dongarra drove away in the car. 
14. Defendant held Mr. Lewis at gunpoint for another hour. During this time, 
defendant was only a few feet away from Mr. Lewis. The two talked. Mr. Lewis saw 
defendant's face from the front. It was still daylight and the lighting allowed Mr. Lewis to see 
defendant's face clearly. 
15. Mr. Lewis was frightened during the event but he was deliberate and thoughtful in 
his approach. Furthermore, Mr. Lewis tried to observe and remember the defendant's face. He 
also tried to engage defendant in a conversation, and did so for a considerable time, in an attempt 
to keep defendant calm so Mr. Lewis would survive the encounter. 
16. Eventually, Mr. Lewis was released and he contacted the police and reported the 
crime. 
17. Approximately ten days later, police showed Mr. Lewis two series of six color 
photographs. One set that included defendant's photo and one set that included Mr. Dongarra's 
photo. The photographs contained different individuals with similar characteristics. Mr. Lewis 
was not told whether the defendant or Mr. Dongarra were in the photographic lineups. Mr. 
Lewis picked out both defendant and Mr. Dongarra. After Mr. Lewis picked out both suspects, 
the detective told Mr. Lewis that he had picked out the two persons arrested for the crime. 
18. On May 4, 1999 a lineup was held in the Salt Lake County S.O. lineup room. 
Eight individuals with similar characteristics were in the lineup. Defendant was included in 
those eight. Again Mr. Lewis picked out defendant as the person who committed the crime 
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charged. Afterwards Mr. Lewis asked the prosecutor if he had picked the defendant. The 
prosecutor confirmed that Mr. Lewis had picked out the person charged with the crime. 
19. Mr. Lewis has never identified persons other than defendant and Mr. Dongarra as 
the two persons who committed the crime. 
20. Mr. Lewis' testimony about the events was detailed and clear. He is an unusually 
articulate and clear witness. He did not know the suspects or have any motive against them. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Mr. Lewis had an adequate opportunity to view the persons who robbed and 
kidnapped him. The event took over two hours, a considerable amount of time to observe. The 
lighting was sufficient. The suspects stood or sat at close distances to Mr. Lewis. Other than the 
dark glasses the suspects' faces were not covered or obscured. 
2. Mr. Lewis paid a high degree of attention to the event. He knew he was being 
robbed. He deliberately tried to see and remember the suspects who where committing the 
crimes of which he was the victim. 
3. Mr. Lewis was not limited or impaired. Instead, he was very deliberate, calm and 
thoughtful. He is also clear and articulate. He was old enough to understand and comprehend 
the nature of the events. He had sufficient capacity to observe and remember the event. 
4. Mr. Lewis' identification was spontaneous and not the product of suggestion. The 
photographic and physical lineups were conducted properly and not in a suggestive manner. 
5. The nature of the event was one that Mr. Lewis was likely to remember and relate 
correctly. The race of the participants was the same. Mr. Lewis was free from bias. Mr. Lewis 
tried to remember the event. It lasted a long time. Mr. Lewis understood that he was being 
robbed and kidnapped. 
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6. The detectives statement confirming that Mr. Lewis had picked out the suspects 
held by the police did not occur until after the photographic lineup was completed. The 
prosecutors statements that Mr. Lewis had picked out the person charged did not occur until after 
the lineup was completed. These statements did not make either the photographic lineup or the 
physical lineup improperly suggestive. 
7. Mr. Lewis' out of court and in court identifications are sufficiently reliable that 
the identifications should be presented to the jury during the trial. 
ORDER 
Having made the above findings of fact and conclusions of law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that the testimony of Mitch Lewis is sufficiently reliable for presentation before the 
trier of fact at the upcoming trial, M /Q^**-^ 
DATED this 33rd71ay of September, 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
ttoifX %nJ[ 
Jsa Reni^l 
LESLIE LEWIS, District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings Of Fact, 
Conclusions Of Law And Order was delivered to Lisa Remal, Attorney for Defendant Jacob 
Ross Hale, at 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City,J3ttahpg4m7on the day of 
September, 1999. 
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JAMES R SOPER 
Solicitor General 
STATE OF U T A H 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JAN G R A H A M 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
HI I rA 
Utah Court of Appeals 
OCT 1 7 2CC3 
PauJette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
REED RICHARDS 
Chief Deputy Attorney General 
Paulette Stagg 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
17 October 2000 
Re: State of Utah v. Hale, Case No. 990939-CA 
Dear Ms. Stagg: 
Since the filing of the Brief of Appellee in this matter, pertinent authority has 
come to my attention concerning the eyewitness identification issue in this case. The 
State cites State v. Rivera, 954 P.2d 225, 227 (Utah App. 1998), which pertains to the 
State's assertion at oral argument that a victim/eyewitness's "ordinary fear" is not alone 
sufficient to defeat the victim's capacity to observe the event, including his or her 
physical and mental acuity. See also Aple. Br. at pp. 27. 
This supplemental authority is submitted pursuant to rule 24(i), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Sincerely, 
ANDI 
Assistant Attorney General 
cc: Catherine E. Lilly 
954 P.2d 225 
336 Utah Adv. Rep. 13 
(Cite as: 954 P.2d 225) 
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Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Danny RIVERA, Defendant and Appellant. 
No. 930154-CA. 
Feb. 12, 1998. 
After his motion to quash bindover of two charges 
from magistrate was denied, defendant entered 
conditional plea of no contest to one charge in return 
for dismissal of other charge in the Third District 
Court, Salt Lake County, Anne M. Stirba, J., and then 
he appealed. The Court of Appeals vacated plea, 871 
P.2d 1023, but the Supreme Court reversed, 906 P.2d 
311. On remand, the Court of Appeals, Howe, J., 
affirmed conviction, 906 P.2d 318, and certiorari was 
granted. The Supreme Court, Durham, J., reversed 
and remanded. The Court of Appeals, Howe, A.C.J., 
held that: (1) showup identification of defendant was 
admissible, and (2) evidence supported bindover 
decision. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Criminal Law <@=>238(1) 
110k238(l) 
In making determination as to probable cause, 
magistrate should view evidence in light most 
favorable to prosecution and resolve all inferences in 
favor of prosecution. 
[2] Criminal Law <®^238(1) 
110k238(l) 
[2] Criminal Law <S^339.8(1) 
110k339.8(l) 
Evidence at preliminary hearing, including witness's 
description of robber's clothing, supported 
magistrate's decision to bind over defendant on 
aggravated robbery charge. 
[3) Criminal Law <£=>234 
110k234 
Witness' showup identification of defendant was 
admissible to show probable cause, where record 
indicated robber was only person in store during 
robbery, witness' attention was focused on robber's 
clothing, she observed that robber was young 
Hispanic male wearing black shirt, black sweat pants, 
dark hat, black tennis shoes, and no socks, and robber 
did not wear mask or otherwise attempt to conceal his 
face; witness had ample opportunity to view robber 
and she paid particular attention to him during course 
of robbery. 
[4] Criminal Law <@^>339.8(6) 
110k339.8(6) 
Victim's ordinary fear was not sufficient to defeat 
reliability of showup identification; even though 
victim was nervous and crying at time of robbery, she 
was still able to carefully observe robber's clothing 
and appearance, and she was able to observe robber 
while she was outside minutes before robbery 
occurred and before she had reason to be fearful. 
[5] Criminal Law <®^>339.8(1) 
110k339.8(l) 
Confrontation. 
Inconsistencies between witness' showup 
identification and lineup identification did not make 
witness so unreliable that identification could not be 
used to establish probable cause, where showup 
identification was made within one hour of robbery 
and lineup identification occurred several months 
later, witness testified that in spite of her 
identification of another individual at lineup, she was 
not positive that person identified at lineup was the 
robber, and witness' description of robber remained 
the same. 
[6] Criminal Law <@^>339.8(5) 
110k339.8(5) 
Any conflicts in witness' description of robber's 
height, brand of his shoes, or details of his hat were 
not significant enough to make her showup 
identification entirely unreliable. 
[7] Criminal Law <@=>234 
110k234 
Circumstances underlying defendant's showup 
identification were not so suggestive that it could not 
be used to establish probable cause, even though 
defendant was chosen by witness while he was 
handcuffed and being held by several police officers. 
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[8] Criminal Law <®^339.8(1) 
110k339.8(l) 
[8] Robbery <@ >^24.40 
342k24.40 
Because defendant's showup identification 
sufficiently met all of the Ramirez reliability factors, 
it was properly used to establish probable cause 
against defendant and bind him over for trial on 
aggravated robbery charges. 
[9] Criminal Law <§^>323 
110k323 
Although flight is not absolute proof of guilt, it may 
support reasonable inference of guilt. 
[10] Criminal Law <£=>238(2) 
110k238(2) 
Prosecution was not required to prove defendant's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt at preliminary 
hearing, rather, it merely needed to present quantum 
of evidence sufficient to warrant submission of case 
to trier of fact. 
*226 Joan C. Watt and Elizabeth A. Bowman, Salt 
Lake City, for Defendant and Appellant. 
Jan Graham and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake 
City, for Plaintiff and Appellee. 
Before HOWE, Associate C.J., [FN1] and BENCH 
and BILLINGS JJ. 
FN1. The Honorable Richard C. Howe, 
Utah Supreme Court Associate Chief 
Justice, sitting by special appointment 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-9.5 
(1995); Utah Code Jud. Admin. RC-108(3). 
OPINION 
HOWE, Associate Chief Justice: 
This case is again before us on remand from the 
supreme court. 
BACKGROUND 
In August 1992, the State charged defendant Danny 
Rivera by an information with count I, aggravated 
robbery; count II, possession of a dangerous weapon 
by a restricted person; and count III, failure to 
respond to an officer's signal to stop. At a 
preliminary hearing on these charges, Rivera moved 
to dismiss counts I and II. The magistrate denied his 
motion and bound him over to stand trial on all three 
counts. In the district court, he moved to quash the 
bindover, but the motion was denied. Thereafter, he 
entered a conditional no contest plea to count II of the 
information, possession of a dangerous weapon by a 
restricted person, a second degree felony, and counts 
I and III were dismissed as part of a plea agreement 
with the prosecutor. As part of his no contest plea, 
he explicitly reserved his right to appeal the adverse 
ruling on his motion to quash the bindover on counts 
I and II. 
On appeal, this court held that the trial court erred in 
accepting Rivera's conditional no contest plea. We 
vacated the plea and remanded the case for trial. 
State v. Rivera, 871 P.2d 1023 (Utah Ct.App.1994). 
However, the supreme court granted certiorari, State 
v. Rivera, 892 P.2d 13 (Utah 1995), reversed this 
court, and remanded the case to us for further 
consideration. On remand, we affirmed the trial 
court's refusal to quash the bindover on count II but 
refused to review the trial court's failure to quash the 
bindover on count I because that charge had been 
dismissed and Rivera had not entered a plea to that 
count. State v. Rivera, 906 P.2d 318 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995). The supreme court again granted 
certiorari, State v. Rivera, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996), 
reversed this court, and remanded this case to us for 
consideration of the trial court's denial of Rivera's 
motion to quash the bindover on count I, aggravated 
robbery. State v. Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997). 
We now consider whether the trial court erred in 
denying Rivera's motion to quash the bindover on 
count I. 
FACTS 
The charges against Rivera arise out of the June 
1992 robbery of a Top Stop convenience store in Salt 
Lake County. The robber showed Brenda Kilgrow, 
the convenience store cashier, a gun and demanded 
money from the cash register. The robber then fled on 
foot, heading north on West Temple Street. Kilgrow 
called the police and described the robber as a young 
Hispanic male, wearing a black T-shirt, black sweat 
pants, black Reebok shoes, no socks, and a dark 
baseball hat. 
Shortly after the robbery, Officer Dusten Hansen 
spotted a truck that was heading north on West 
Temple Street, about five blocks from the 
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convenience store. He noticed that the driver of the 
truck fit the general description of the robber that was 
given by the police dispatcher. He pulled *227 
behind the truck and turned on his overhead lights, 
signaling the driver to pull over. However, the driver 
did not pull over and began to accelerate to speeds of 
60 to 70 miles an hour. The truck eventually crashed 
into a bus stop bench, and the driver fled on foot. 
Officer Hansen parked his own vehicle and chased 
after the driver on foot. The driver then returned to 
the scene of the wreck, unsuccessfully attempted to 
start Officer Hansen's vehicle, and then tried to jump 
into a slow moving car that was passing by. The 
driver was ultimately apprehended and identified as 
defendant Danny Rivera. 
The police searched Rivera's truck and found a 
Ruger P85 9mm handgun and a dark blue New York 
Yankees baseball cap inside the cab. Rivera was a 
young- looking, Hispanic male and wore clothing 
matching Kilgrow's description of the robber. 
Officer Chris Snyder brought Kilgrow back to where 
Rivera was being detained. The morning was bright 
and Kilgrow did not have trouble seeing him. He was 
handcuffed and was forced to face her. She 
positively identified him as the robber. 
Several months after the robbery, Kilgrow attended a 
police lineup. Rivera was not included in the lineup, 
[FN2] and Kilgrow identified another individual as 
the robber. However, at the preliminary hearing, 
Kilgrow testified that she had not been certain about 
her selection at the lineup. 
FN2. Because the individuals selected for 
the lineup did not closely resemble 
Rivera, the prosecution and defense 
stipulated to a lineup that did not 
include Rivera. Kilgrow was 
apparently instructed that Rivera may 
or may not be in the lineup. She was 
told that if she did not recognize 
anyone, she was to write that down. 
Nevertheless, she identified another 
individual who was in the lineup as the 
robber. 
ANALYSIS 
[1] The ultimate decision "to bind a defendant over 
for trial presents a question of law, which we review 
de novo without deference." State v. Jaeger, 896 
P.2d 42, 44 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (citing State v. 
Humphrey, 823 P.2d 464, 466 (Utah 1991)). The 
parties agree that "[t]he probable cause showing at 
the preliminary examination must establish a prima 
facie case against the defendant from which the trier 
of fact could conclude the defendant was guilty of the 
offense as charged." State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 
778, 783 (Utah 1980). While this case has been 
pending on appeal, the Utah Supreme Court has 
explained this standard further. In State v. Pledger, 
896 P.2d 1226 (Utah 1995), the court stated that "[i]n 
making a determination as to probable cause, the 
magistrate should view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the prosecution and resolve all inferences 
in favor of the prosecution." Id. at 1229 (citations 
omitted). The court also explained that " '[ujnless 
the evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of 
reasonable inferences to prove some issue which 
supports the [prosecution's] claim,' the magistrate 
should bind the defendant over for trial." Id. (quoting 
Cruz v. Montoya, 660 P.2d 723, 729 (Utah 1983)). 
With these principles in mind, we turn to the evidence 
introduced by the prosecution at the preliminary 
hearing to determine if it was sufficient to establish 
probable cause and bind Rivera over for trial on the 
aggravated robbery charge. 
[2] At the preliminary hearing, the prosecution 
introduced evidence that Rivera matched Kilgrow's 
description of the robber. It is undisputed that 
Rivera is a young-looking Hispanic male. 
Furthermore, at the time of his arrest, he was wearing 
a black shirt, black sweat pants, black tennis shoes, 
and no socks. Nevertheless, Rivera contends that 
Kilgrow's description of the robber does not 
accurately match him. He argues that although he 
was wearing black tennis shoes, they were not 
Reeboks, as described by Kilgrow. He also points 
out that Kilgrow's description of the baseball hat 
allegedly worn by the robber did not include the 
obvious white New York Yankees insignia or white 
stripes found on the hat in his truck. Although 
Rivera's points are accurate, they merely point out 
conflicts and inconsistencies in the evidence. As we 
explained above, the magistrate was required to 
resolve such conflicts and inconsistencies in favor of 
the prosecution. See Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229; see 
also Jaeger, 896 P.2d at 45-46 (holding that the 
"magistrate should not have decided issues [against 
the prosecution] *228 where the evidence was in 
conflict"). On this basis, we conclude that the 
magistrate correctly decided that Kilgrow's 
description of the robber's clothing closely matched 
that worn by Rivera at the time of his arrest and 
supported the State's contention that he was the 
robber. 
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The prosecution also introduced Kilgrow's showup 
identification of Rivera as evidence at the preliminary 
hearing. Rivera contends that this identification was 
so inherently unreliable that it could not support a 
showing of probable cause. We disagree. The 
parties agree that the decision in State v. Ramirez, 
817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), is helpful to our analysis 
of the reliability question at issue in this case even 
though Ramirez dealt with the admissibility of a 
showup identification at trial. In Ramirez, the Utah 
Supreme Court set forth the following factors that 
must be used to determine the reliability of an 
eyewitness identification: 
"(1) [T]he opportunity of the witness to view the 
actor during the event; (2) the witness's degree of 
attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3) 
the witness's capacity to observe the event, 
including his or her physical and mental acuity; 
(4) whether the witness's identification was made 
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, 
or whether it was the product of suggestion; and 
(5) the nature of the event being observed and the 
likelihood that the witness would perceive, 
remember and relate it correctly." 
Id. at 781 (quoting State v. Long, 721 P.2d 483, 493 
(Utah 1986)). Even though the court found that the 
facts in Ramirez presented "an extremely close case," 
the court held that the witness's showup identification 
of Ramirez was admissible as evidence at his trial. 
Id. at 784. 
[3] In assailing the showup identification of him, 
Rivera first contends that Kilgrow's identification 
fails to meet the first and second reliability factors of 
Ramirez because she did not pay particular attention 
to the robber during the robbery. However, the 
record shows otherwise. The robber was the only 
other person in the store during the robbery. Rivera 
acknowledges that Kilgrow's attention was focused on 
his clothing. She observed that he was a young 
Hispanic male who was wearing a black shirt, black 
sweat pants, a dark hat, black tennis shoes, and no 
socks. He did not wear a mask or otherwise attempt 
to conceal his face. She also saw him flee north on 
foot. In light of Kilgrow's detailed observations of 
the robber, there is evidence that she had ample 
opportunity to view him and that she did pay 
particular attention to him during the course of the 
robbery. 
[4] Rivera next contends that Kilgrow's identification 
of him also fails to meet the third reliability factor of 
Ramirez because she was nervous and afraid during 
the robbery. However, we do not think that the 
victim's ordinary fear is sufficient to defeat this 
factor. Otherwise, no victim of a violent crime could 
ever meet this factor. Even though Kilgrow was 
nervous and crying at the time of the robbery, she was 
still able to carefully observe the robber's clothing 
and appearance. Furthermore, she was able to 
observe the robber while she was outside smoking a 
cigarette, minutes before the robbery occurred and 
before she had reason to be fearful. For these 
reasons, we conclude that Kilgrow's identification 
adequately meets this factor. 
[5] The fourth reliability factor is the most difficult 
to meet in this case. Rivera correctly points out that 
Kilgrow's identification of him has not remained 
entirely consistent because she identified the wrong 
man during the lineup. He also contends that the 
conflicts in her description of the robber demonstrate 
further inconsistencies in her identification. 
Nevertheless, we do not believe that these 
inconsistencies necessarily make her showup 
identification so unreliable that it cannot be used to 
establish probable cause. 
While her showup identification was made within an 
hour of the robbery, the lineup identification did not 
take place until several months later. Furthermore, 
during the preliminary hearing, Kilgrow testified that 
in spite of her identification of another individual at 
the lineup, she was not positive that the person she 
had identified at the lineup was the robber. She 
explained that she was nervous *229 during the 
lineup, paid little attention to the prosecutor's 
instructions, and did not really read the instruction 
card. She also testified that she picked the person in 
the lineup who most closely resembled Rivera. The 
magistrate was required to view this testimony in 
favor of the prosecution. Therefore, the magistrate 
correctly viewed Kilgrow's testimony as a reasonable 
explanation for her misidentification of the robber at 
the lineup. 
[6] In addition, contrary to Rivera's assertion, 
Kilgrow's description of the robber has remained the 
same. At the time of the robbery, she described the 
robber as a young Hispanic male wearing a black 
shirt, black sweats, a dark hat, black Reebok tennis 
shoes, and no socks. She has not recanted this 
description. Furthermore, any conflicts in her 
description of his height, the brand of his shoes, or 
the details of his hat were not significant enough to 
make her identification entirely unreliable. The 
magistrate determined that she was "no rocket 
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scientist" and properly left the resolution of such 
conflicts for the jury at trial. 
[7] We also do not believe that the circumstances 
underlying Kilgrow's showup identification were so 
suggestive that it could not be used to establish 
probable cause. Although it is true that Kilgrow 
identified Rivera while he was handcuffed and being 
held by several police officers, we find that these 
circumstances are remarkably similar to those in 
Ramirez. In that case, the witness identified Ramirez 
while he was handcuffed to a chain-linked fence and 
was surrounded by police officers. Ramirez, 817 
P.2d at 784. Additionally, police officers in Ramirez 
remarked that they had apprehended someone who fit 
the description of one of the robbers. Id. 
Notwithstanding these circumstances, the court 
concluded that the showup identification was still 
admissible as evidence at trial. Id. Likewise, we 
conclude that the circumstances underlying Kilgrow's 
showup identification of Rivera were not so 
suggestive to make it wholly unreliable. 
Finally, Rivera does not seriously contend that 
Kilgrow's identification fails to meet the fifth factor 
of Ramirez. Kilgrow was robbed when the 
convenience store was not yet open for regular 
business. The robber was the only other person 
inside the store at the time. The nature of this event 
made it likely that she would perceive and remember 
the event correctly. 
[8] Because Kilgrow's showup identification 
sufficiently meets all of the Ramirez reliability 
factors, we conclude that it was properly used to 
establish probable cause against Rivera and bind him 
over for trial on the aggravated robbery charges. 
Furthermore, the magistrate correctly viewed this 
evidence in favor of the prosecution. 
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[9] In addition to Kilgrow's description of the robber 
and her showup identification of Rivera, the 
prosecution also introduced other evidence that 
supported the showing of probable cause. It 
presented the Ruger P85 9mm handgun that was 
found in Rivera's truck at the time of his arrest. The 
gun was especially significant, given Kilgrow's 
statements and testimony that the robber had shown 
her a handgun that was stuck in the waistband of his 
pants during the robbery. The prosecution also 
submitted evidence of Rivera's close proximity to the 
convenience store shortly after the robbery. 
Furthermore, it introduced evidence of his flight after 
Officer Hansen had signaled him to pull over. 
Although flight is not absolute proof of guilt, it may 
support a reasonable inference of guilt. See State v. 
James, 819 P.2d 781, 789 (Utah 1991) (stating 
evidence of flight may establish an inference of guilt). 
In sum, this additional evidence further supported the 
inference that Rivera committed the robbery at issue 
in this case. 
[10] In conclusion, the prosecution's evidence was 
sufficient to show probable cause and bind Rivera 
over for trial on the aggravated robbery charge. The 
prosecution was not required to prove Rivera's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt at the preliminary hearing. 
See Anderson, 612 P.2d at 783. Rather, it merely 
needed io "present a quantum of evidence sufficient 
to warrant submission of the case to the trier of fact." 
Id. In light of the foregoing, it is evident that the 
prosecution did this at the preliminary hearing. 
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's denial of *230 
Rivera's motion to quash the bindover on count I, 
aggravated robbery. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
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